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Abstract 
 
This report discusses inventory and source term properties in regard to operation 
and possible releases due to accidents from Russian marine reactor systems. 
The first part of the report discusses relevant accidents on the basis of both Rus-
sian and western sources. The overview shows that certain vessels were much 
more accident prone compared to others, in addition, there have been a notewor-
thy reduction in accidents the last two decades. However, during the last years 
new types of incidents, such as collisions, has occurred more frequently. The 
second part of the study considers in detail the most important factors for the 
source term; reactor operational characteristics and the radionuclide inventory. 
While Russian icebreakers has been operated on a similar basis as commercial 
power plants, the submarines has different power cyclograms which results in 
considerable lower values for fission product inventory. Theoretical values for 
radionuclide inventory are compared with computed results using the modelling 
tool HELIOS. Regarding inventory of transuranic elements, the results of the cal-
culations are discussed in detail for selected vessels. Criticality accidents, loss-
of-cooling accidents and sinking accidents are considered, bases on actual ex-
periences with these types of accident and on theoretical considerations, and 
source terms for these accidents are discussed in the last chapter. 
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Abstract 
 
This report discusses inventory and source term properties in regard to operation and possible 
releases due to accidents from Russian marine reactor systems. The first part of the report 
discusses relevant accidents on the basis of both Russian and western sources. The overview 
shows that certain vessels were much more accident prone compared to others, in addition, there 
have been a noteworthy reduction in accidents the last two decades. However, during the last 
years new types of incidents, such as collisions, has occurred more frequently. The second part of 
the study considers in detail the most important factors for the source term; reactor operational 
characteristics and the radionuclide inventory. While Russian icebreakers has been operated on a 
similar basis as commercial power plants, the submarines has different power cyclograms  which 
results in considerable lower values for fission product inventory. Theoretical values for 
radionuclide inventory are compared with computed results using the modelling tool HELIOS. 
Regarding inventory of transuranic elements, the results of the calculations are discussed in detail 
for selected vessels. Criticality accidents, loss-of-cooling accidents and sinking accidents are 
considered, bases on actual experiences with these types of accident and on theoretical 
considerations, and source terms for these accidents are discussed in the last chapter. 
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Foreword 
 
In 2003 Nordic Nuclear Safety Research (NKS) sponsored a seminar on the safety of Russian 
nuclear submarines and the risk for releases of radioactivity. The following recommendation was 
made at the seminar: 
 
The main recommendation made (…)was that there still is a need for analysing specific elements 
related to source term analysis of Russian marine reactors and naval fuel when considering possible 
accidents and consequences for the Nordic countries: if available, evaluating all available design 
information for marine reactors and fuel, complete studies of release fractions for specific accidents 
(LOCA, criticality accidents when refueling/ defueling) with releases to air and/ or sea, examine the 
possibility for recriticality in spent fuel configurations on shore (i.e. in storage at former naval 
bases) for PWR marine reactors and in spent removal blocks from liquid metal reactors. 
 
On the basis of the seminar, NKS initiated a project with the objective to work out two scientific 
reports: 
 
Report 1: Russian Nuclear Power Plants for Marine Applications 
Report 2:  Inventory and Source Term Evaluation of Russian Nuclear Power Plants for 
Marine Applications 
 
The following paper is the second report, as the first report a result of cooperation between Risø 
Laboratories, Denmark and Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority, Norway. 
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1 Introduction 
The present report deals with source terms for accidents involving Russian marine nuclear 
reactors. The operation of a nuclear vessel fleet is a complex process involving a large number of 
smaller operations, including for example construction, operation, maintenance, refueling, 
decommissioning and defueling. For each of these processes, there is a certain risk of accidental 
releases of radionuclides. Such releases depends also on a number of other factors such as the 
type of accident, the type of reactor, the reactor power and the length of the operational time of 
the reactor prior to the accident etc. If the accident happens some time after reactor shut-down, 
the activity release depends also on the length of the shut-down period.  
 
This report is based on considerations of Russian marine nuclear systems, more specific 
icebreaker and submarine nuclear reactors. As discussed in the other NKS-report from this project 
(NucVess), there are many different types of reactors. Considering the numerous accidents 
scenarios covering both releases to the marine and the terrestrial environment and all possible 
inventories, the number of relevant combinations relevant for further considerations as part of full 
scope impact assessments is too many to be included in this study. On this basis, this work has 
been divided into three parts as described in the following chapters; 1) analysis of relevant 
incidents and accidents, 2) calculation of reactor inventory taking the results from NucVess on 
reactor and core configuration into account in addition to operational data (calculated and 
reported in other sources), 3) source term considerations.  
 
While Part 3 was a major motivation for this work, this part is the least developed part of this 
report. The reason for this fact, despite the initial project description as put forward from the NKS 
seminar, is that for the other relevant parts for describing a realistic source term, such as accident 
scenarios and inventory, a lot of new information surfaced during this work which has been duly 
analyzed and summarized. As described in chapter 5.1, the Norwegian government has agreed to 
continue the project, then also including impact assessments for the marine environment in case 
of releases to sea, in order to have a more careful description of the release mechanisms with 
regard to accidents involving Russian marine vessels taking the results in this report into account.  
 
 
1.1 What is a source term?  
The source term is used to describe the release of radioactive materials from a specific source. 
Therefore, data on several parameters related to the release are necessary to have precise 
knowledge of the source term; 
 
• Inventory (types of isotopes, forms and composition); 
• Release composition; 
• Release as a function of time; 
• Energy content (lift); 
• Release point/ height; 
 
The source term itself is thereby dependant on a number of different factors, such as the fuel 
matrix, cladding, pressure vessel and containment. Part of the source term is the release fraction, 
being established from information on the three first bullets points above. The release fraction is 
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the fraction of the total activity of the fission product released to the environment during the 
accident. This report will not primarily consider the quantitative aspects of the risk itself, but 
focus the different factors contributing to the source term and the release fractions for different 
types of accidents involving Russian naval reactors and spent fuel. 
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2 Experiences with operation of Russian marine reactors 
The risks connected to the operation of nuclear reactors, commercial power reactors as well as 
research reactors, are in general estimated by use of theoretical risk analyses since the number of 
accidents that has actually occurred, has been so low that they cannot be used for risk assessment. 
This is not the case when it comes to the nuclear vessels of the Soviet/Russian Navy. Here a 
significant number of accidents have occurred, and it is therefore reasonable to assess the risks of 
accidents and their consequences based on information of these accidents. To access which types 
of accidents should be considered, a review is made of the rather numerous number of accidents 
that have occurred with Russian nuclear submarines. From this review the relevant accident types 
are identified. A more detailed discussion of these accidents is presented and the source terms for 
such accidents are considered.  
 
In total, 110 incidents have been reviewed in this study. However, this includes both major 
accidents with subsequent releases and loss of complete crew down to less serious incidents with 
no casualties and minor consequences for the submarine itself. It should therefore be remembered 
that there may well have been accidents that are not included in the present analysis, but also that 
some of the accidents considered may have been trivial events.1 However, as these might result in 
incidents with more substantial consequences, they have been included. The distribution 
according to the three factors 1) incident type, 2) type and class of vessel, and 3) time, will be 
discussed in this report. 
 
While the incident type is relevant for identifying relevant scenarios for future accidents, 
considerations has to be regarding which type of vessel involved in these incidents and in which 
time span they have occurred. This has been done in order to sort out if possible technologies or 
types of vessels are susceptible to certain types of incidents. It should be noted that in many cases 
no information is available on accident cause or possible consequences for the vessel itself, crew 
or local population if relevant. In addition the handling of the spent fuel, after it has left the 
reactor, may also give rise to accidents such as loss-of-shielding accidents and leakage of 
radioactive materials from damaged fuel, so a fourth type of accident, spent fuel accidents should 
also be considered. This is not part of the mandate for this report. 
 
|The basis of the present analysis is [Kotcher], [Apalkov1,2,3,4] and [Oelgaard1]. The latter has 
been supplemented by media information on the two latest accidents. A summary of all the 
accidents considered is presented in Annex I on table form. 
 
 
                                                          
1 When comparing with other investigations as presented in [Olgaard1] the total number of accidents 
considered was 38, so much fewer accidents were considered than in [Apalkov]. On the other hand 
[Olgaard1] covers all classes of Russian nuclear submarines, not just the first generation. Most of the 
accidents with first generation submarines in [Olgaard1] are also included in [Apalkov], but a few are not. 
[Olgaard1] covers in general the most serious accidents, but here too some of the accidents may have been 
incidents. All of the accidents in [Olgaard1] except two occurred in nuclear submarines. 
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2.1 Distribution of incidents 
The distribution of the incidents according to incident type is presented in table 2.1. The 
categories involve very different type of incidents, ranging from small fires to large, criticality 
accidents with substantial releases of radioactivity to the atmosphere.  
 
The categories used have been decided on the basis of the goal of this work. Reactor system 
failures are, together with criticality accidents, self-evident categories due to the relevance for 
containing the radioactivity in the core. Fire seems to be an important initiating event in Russian 
submarines in particular, at several instances with a fatal result. In order to single out instances 
where the submarine has sunk, whatever cause, this has been included as separate category as part 
of the overall total and will be discussed separately in chapter 2.1.4. 
 
It is seen from Table 2.1 that the most frequent accident as such is fire, which also killed most 
crewmembers and in two cases lead to the sinking of the submarine. The type of accident which 
caused the largest loss of life per accident is – hardly surprising – explosions. In the two cases 
listed the submarines sank. There were six cases of loss-of-cooling accidents which caused fuel 
damage and which lead to replacement of the reactor compartment or decommissioning of the 
submarines. Of the five criticality accidents two were related to refueling and three occurred 
during repair or tests of the reactor at the shipyard. They lead also to replacement of the 
replacement of the reactors or to decommissioning. The coolant solidification accidents all refer 
to the liquid metal cooled reactors. Propulsion failure deals with turbine or similar failures. Of the 
5 sinking accidents the submarine was recovered in one case, but in the other cases it remains at 
the bottom of the sea. There have been a number of collisions between Russian submarines and 
other vessels, not the least caused by the tense relations during the Cold War. But since 
submarines are vessels of war they are built to withstand powerful mechanical actions from the 
outside and consequently collisions will usually not lead to serious damage (see chapter 2.1.5). 
 
 
Table 2.1 Distribution of Incidents with Russian Nuclear Ships According to Type of Incident 
 
Type of accident         No. of accidents     Release of 
radioactivity  
Number of persons 
killed             
Fires and explosions 34 1-2 326 
 Explosion                    (6)  (124) 
Criticality                    5 3-5 17 
Reactor system failure              39 6-14 18 
 LOCA (6) (3) (12) 
 Leaks/ fuel failure (21) (2-4) (1) 
Coolant solidification (3) (1-2)  
Other 32 0-1 54 
 Propulsion/  turbine failure    (4)   
 Collision                    (10)  (27) 
 Flooding (8)  (16) 
Total  110 14-26 415 
 Sinking (5)  (225) 
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2.1.1 Fires and explosions 
Fires and explosions, even though they will usually not affect the reactor system directly, may 
lead to the sinking of the submarine. If the submarine is not recovered this will sooner or later 
lead to the release of radioactive material. The first serious accidents were K 3 in 1967 with 39 
fatalities. Then a hydraulic pipeline in the first compartment sprang a leak, the inflammable oil 
caused a short-circuit in a lamp whereby the oil was ignited and the fire started. The fire spread to 
the second compartment either because a oil beam broke through a bulkhead or in connection 
with an attempt to evacuate the crew of the first compartment. The crew of the first and part of 
the crew of the second compartment died from suffocation, either caused by the CO produced by 
the fire or by CO2 used in the automatic fire extinguishing system. The second fatal fire occurred 
April 11, 1970 at K 8 a couple of days before the vessel sank in Bay of Biscaya. 52 crew 
members died during the accident due to toxic fumes.2 The next fatal fire occurred when K-278 
(Komsomolets) sank April 7, 1989, and 38 sailors drowned as the sub sank. None of the fires 
seems to have affected the reactor system to the extent that extensive releases of radioactivity 
were a result. 
 
2.1.2 Reactor system failures 
According to this categorization, reactor system failure is the most common reason for a release 
related incident involving Russian marine reactors. Regarding the different subcategories, LOCA 
represents the most serious incident, with leaks as relevant initiating event. There were six 
LOCA’s, which caused fuel damage and which lead to replacement of the reactor compartment or 
decommissioning of the submarines. Coolant solidification was relevant for the liquid-metal 
cooled Russian submarine reactors which have all been taken out of service. The leak accidents 
are leaks that could have lead to a LOCA, but did not. They may have been trivial. 
 
LOCA is definitely extremely serious, in particular in the context of this work since releases of 
radioactivity is a well-known consequences. The first major leak in a Russian submarine 
occurred, according to Ølgaard, already October 13 1960 involving one of the steam generators 
and probably also the pressurizer, directly or through the leaking steam generator. Helium and 
steam was then released in the turbine compartment. The reactor was shut down and 
arrangements made for cooling of the core, however, radioactive gas leaked into all 
compartments. 13 personnel were exposed to 180-200 rem and hospitalised, one sailor died two 
years later. The sub reached its base on own power, but was subsequently decontaminated. 
 
The first LOCA occurred July 3 1961 in K 19, also called “Hiroshima” due to a reputation for 
being accident prone. A major leak in a pipe of the pressurizer system developed when the 
submarine was returning form an exercise. Coolant temperature was at about 300 oC and pressure 
                                                          
2 Two fires started simultaneously on April 8th, one in the third and one in the eighth compartment when 
the K8 was sailing submerged, returning from an exercise.  The reactors were shut down and K8 surfaced. 
The diesel power plant could not be started, so the submarine lay dead in the sea. The crew tried in vain to 
fight the fires. The control room and several of the other compartments were filled with toxic fumes. To 
keep K8 floating air had to be pumped into the aft ballast tanks. On April 10th the air supply was exhausted 
and water started floating into the 7th and 8th compartments. K8 sank on April 11th at a depth of 4680 m. 
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at 200 atm. The pressure decreased and coolant started to boil. The reactor was shut down 
automatically. However, the temperature in reactor compartment reached at least 140 oC. 
Radioactive air dispersed in the sub, dose rate in the control room was up to 50 R/h, and very high 
in the reactor compartment. The cooling of the core was insufficient due to no or a defect 
emergency core cooling system (ECCS). The temperature of the fuel reached 800 oC. To avoid a 
core meltdown an improvised ECCS was installed in a few hours by crew members working in 
periods of 5-10 minutes in the reactor compartment. After returning to base, the sub was 
decontaminated and repaired. The reason for the leak was probably exposure by a mistake of the 
primary system to 400 atm. at the pressure testing during the commissioning. Another LOCA, 
this time claimed not to result in any human fatalities, occurred July 2 in 1979 in the Pacific near 
Russia. The operator at the control panel turned by mistake the main circulation pumps off, the 
emergency core coolant system did not work and due to the confusion in the control room the 
pumps were not restarted. The core was exposed and part of the fuel melted. No activity escaped 
to the environment. 
 
The LOCA which occurred in 1966 when three reactors of Lenin underwent refuelling is the only 
incident in this report registered for civilian Russian nuclear vessels. The water was then drained 
from the second reactor before the spent fuel had been removed, probably due an operator error. 
The decay heat and the lack of cooling resulted in melting and/or deformation of some of the fuel 
elements. After this accident it was only possible to remove 94 of the fuel elements while the 
remaining 125 could not be removed. The damaged fuel had to be removed by removing the core 
insert or basket, which carried all the fuel. After the accident the three OK-150 reactors were 
replaced by two OK-900 units. 
 
The coolant solidification accidents all refer to the liquid metal cooled reactors and will often lead 
to a loss-of-cooling accident. This submarine was provided with two Bi-Pb cooled intermediate 
reactors. In-leaks of steam from the steam generators into the primary circuit caused oxidation of 
the liquid metal coolant whereby oxide particles were formed. Therefore the coolant had to be 
cleaned of these particles at regular intervals. In May 1968 the coolant needed a cleaning, but the 
K27 was nevertheless ordered to participate in a naval exercise. Protests from the crew were not 
accepted. On May 24 K27 was sailing at full power when the power meter of the starboard 
reactor started to oscillate and the power of the port reactor went down to 7% of full power, after 
which the reactor was shut down. The reason was that after a leak, presumable in a port steam 
generator, the oxide particle concentration had increased to a point, where the particles blocked 
the coolant flow to part of the core and the fuel melted. Fission products were released from the 
primary circuit to a safety buffer tank and from here to the reactor compartment where the 
radiation level increased to 100 R/h. Later contamination spread to the other compartments. The 
submarine returned at the surface to its base by use of the starboard reactor. 
 
While K192 was in transit from the Mediterranean Sea to Severomorsk a leak developed in a 
component in the primary circuit. The reactor was shut down, the submarine surfaced, the 
auxiliary diesel engine started and the submarine continued at a speed of 5 knots. However, the 
leak was of such magnitude that the cooling was not sufficient and part of the fuel was damaged. 
Further the submarine did not have sufficient water supplies so ships were sent out with extra 
water supplies. The leaking water was collected in tanks. Due to lack of power the air-condition 
system was switched off and the temperature in the submarine increased. In the reactor 
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compartment it reached 150oC. After the return to base the submarine was transferred to the No. 
10 Shkval shipyard where compressed air is pumped into the hull to maintain buoyancy. 
 
The second type of nuclear accident is the loss-of-cooling accident or LOCA. These accidents 
will usually occur when the reactor is operating. If the cooling fails at this stage, e.g. because of a 
coolant leakage, the control system will shut down the reactor. But the decay heat from the decay 
of the fission products will continue to produce power in the reactor core and if the emergency 
core cooling system does not work properly (or does not exist), the fuel will heat up and possibly 
melt and contaminate the primary system. If there is a leak in the system or the safety valves open 
due to too high a pressure, contaminated steam and water will enter the reactor compartment. If 
this compartment is not closed, the rest of the submarine may also be contaminated. A LOCA 
may also occur if the reactor has very recently been shut down and the cooling system does not 
work properly. 
 
Of the six LOCA’s of Russian nuclear vessels three occurred in first generation submarines, one 
in the icebreaker Lenin, one in the Project 645 submarine (liquid metal cooling) and one in a first 
or second generation submarine. In two cases a leak developed in the primary circuit, in one case 
an operator drained the reactor tank by mistake, in another an operator stopped by mistake the 
main cooling pumps and in one case a valve failed to close. The final case involved the Project 
645 submarine where impurities in the coolant blocked the inlet to part of the core. In all cases the 
fuel was damaged and in the five submarine accidents the interior of the submarines was 
contaminated. The five submarine accidents occurred with the reactor at power. The accident of 
the NS Lenin occurred shortly after reactor shutdown. 
 
It seems that little radioactivity escaped from the submarines during and after the accidents even 
though all the interior of the submarines were more or less contaminated. The reason is 
presumably that the pressure hull of the submarines acts as a good containment. It is strong, has 
few openings and a large part of it is in close contact with the ocean which acts as a heat sink that 
helps to condense the steam and reduce the pressure, thereby reducing the leakage from the 
submarine. 
 
A special type of LOCA is the solidification of the coolant in liquid metal cooled reactors. While 
this type of accident may not lead to escape of radioactive material from the reactor, it will 
usually lead to damage of the fuel.  
 
2.1.3 Criticality 
The first criticality accident involving a Russian submarine occurred February 12 1965. The 
accident occurred at the end of a refuelling when the reactor lid was put back on top of the reactor 
tank, but not quite correctly so that it had to be repositioned. To do this the lid had to be relifted 
with the control rods connected to the lid. To avoid lifting the lid too high up so that the reactor 
would go critical a beam was placed over the lid. Unfortunately the beam was by mistake placed 
too high up so that the reactor went critical. According to one source it was not understood what 
had happened, so some days later on a new attempt was made to lift the lid and the reactor went 
critical again. This time radioactive steam was ejected from the reactor and the lid fell down in a 
tilted position on top of the tank. A fire started in the reactor compartment. It was fought with 
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water, which spread to the other compartments. Seven crew members suffered radiation injuries, 
while one of the reactors was destroyed. Later on the complete reactor compartment was 
replaced. 
 
August 23, 1968, another criticality incident occurred, again at a Russian shipyard in Northwest-
Russia. During repair/maintenance work on the submarine the wiring of the control rods were not 
performed correctly. When a mechanical test was performed on the rods - without the neutron 
monitoring system working - the rods moved out of the core rather than into the core and the 
reactor went critical. The power level has been claimed to reach 20 times the nominal level and 
the pressure went up to 800 atm., 4 times the nominal pressure. While the primary circuit was 
strongly contaminated, there has not been reported any casualties or extensive contamination. But 
apparently there were no leaks. Less than two years later, January 18 1970 at the “Krasnoye 
Somovo" shipyard in Gorki, now Nizhniy Novgorod, K 320 was being constructed. At the end of 
its construction hydraulic tests were performed with fuel in the core. However the reactor was 
only provided with provisional control rods which had not been fixed sufficiently, so that they 
were lifted out of the core when the coolant velocity reached high values and the reactor went 
critical. Activity was released into the factory hall and the reactor and its fuel was replaced. No 
information is available on doses to the shipyard staff. Another criticality incident, also with no 
information on releases of activity to the environment, occurred autumn 1980 at a shipyard in 
Severodvinsk when K222 was undergoing a major overhaul. When the crew had left for lunch 
and only personnel from the shipyard was present, they supplied power to the control rod drives 
while the instrumentation system was not working. The control rods moved out of the core, and 
the reactor went critical. There were no casualties and no release of activity to the environment. 
 
The most serious accident to date involving a Russian submarine was the criticality accident in 
Chazma Bay August 10, 1985. After reloading the reactors with new fuel the reactor tank lid was 
placed on top of the tank. However, the lid had not been properly placed so it had to be relifted 
with the control rods attached. The beam above the lid to prevent lifting the lid too high up had 
not been placed properly so the lid went up too far and the reactor became supercritical. The 
steam explosion destroyed the forward and aft rooms, damaged the pressure hull and ejected part 
of the fuel out of the submarine. A fire broke out immediately after the explosion and was only 
extinguished in four hours. The release properties are further discussed in chapter 5 of this report. 
 
Of the five criticality accidents two were related to refueling and three occurred during repair or 
tests of the reactor at the shipyard. They lead also to replacement of the replacement of the 
reactors or to decommissioning. All criticality accidents of the Russian Navy have occurred when 
the reactor was shut down and the control system was not operational. To start moving control 
rods or fuel under such conditions may easily lead to criticality accidents since the personnel 
involved has no knowledge of how close the reactor is to criticality. When the reactor becomes 
supercritical, the chain reaction starts and reactor power increases very rapidly, in particular if the 
reactor becomes prompt supercritical. The power increase will usually lead to overheating and 
melting of the fuel whereby fission products are released to the primary circuit. It will also lead to 
a rapid pressure built-up in the reactor system, which will open the safety valves of the system so 
that radioactive steam will be released into the reactor compartment. The pressure may even 
become so high that the primary circuit ruptures and contaminated steam and cooling water are 
released into the reactor compartment. If this compartment is not sealed, the other compartments 
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of the submarine are likely to be contaminated too. However, if the compartment is sealed, the 
contamination should be limited to the reactor compartment.  
 
During re/defueling the hull above the reactor is removed so that the reactor vessel can be opened, 
the burned fuel removed and new fuel elements loaded into the reactor. If a criticality accident 
occurs at this stage the criticality accident will cause an excursion of steam, hot water, fuel 
element parts and radionuclides, which will rapidly reach the environment outside the 
submarine... 
 
To prevent criticality accidents during defueling of decommissioned submarines, it has been 
proposed to drain the reactor and the primary system of water prior to the defueling. If this is 
done the reactor cannot go critical due to the lack of moderator. It has been found that drainage of 
the primary system is permissible provided the reactor has been shut down for more than two 
years. In that case the fuel elements will not overheat even if all coolant is removed. Whether this 
procedure is actually/always used is not clear, but if so it is of vital importance that it is really 
ensured that the water has been completely removed from the reactor tank before it is opened.  
 
As seen from Annex I the two criticality accidents which have occurred in the Russian Navy 
during refueling involved first generation submarines. In both cases they occurred after the 
reactors had been refueled, i.e. contained new fuel, and the lid of the reactor tank was to be placed 
on top of the tank. In both cases the lid was not placed quite correctly. Therefore it had to be 
relifted. At this stage the control rods were connected to the drive mechanisms on the lid, the lid 
was lifted too highly up and the reactors went critical. According to [Elatomtsev] such an event 
cannot occur at second and third generation submarines. The neutron monitoring and the control 
system were not operational during the accidents. 
 
The other three criticality accidents all occurred when the submarines were undergoing 
maintenance or tests at shipyards. None of them were first generation submarines. The neutron 
monitoring and the control systems were not operational, so they could not shut down the reactors 
once they became critical. Under normal operational conditions the control system will shut down 
the reactor when it becomes supercritical. 
 
It is obvious that the worst criticality accidents are those during re/defueling when the reactor is 
open to the environment. Fortunately, the two criticality accidents, which occurred during 
refuelling, occurred after the new fuel had been loaded into the reactor. If a criticality accident 
occurs during defueling, the fuel in the core is burned fuel, which contains large amounts of 
fission products. In this case the release of activity will be significantly increased. 
 
After a criticality accident the reactor is beyond repair. The reactor compartment has to be 
replaced by a new compartment or the submarine has to be decommissioned. 
 
Criticality accidents may also occur during handling of spent fuel in connection with transport 
and storage. Since the amount of fuel handled at one time is usually limited, 49 fuel elements per 
transport container, and the geometry is “safe”, such accidents are very unlikely. Another 
possibility is the flooding of a facility for dry storage of spent fuel. If the fuel is not placed in a 
safe geometry, flooding could possibly make the facility critical. 
 17
 
2.1.4 Sinking Accidents 
Nuclear accidents in Russian submarines have not lead to the sinking of submarines, but other 
accidents have. Most if not all of the 11 fire accidents seems to have started while the submarines 
were sailing submerged, but the submarines managed to reach the surface. Nevertheless two of 
the submarines sank later. In the two explosion accidents the submarines were both sailing 
submerged. In one case the submarine managed to reach the surface, but it sank later on. In the 
other case it went straight to the bottom of the sea, from where it was later salvaged (Kursk). So 
fires and explosions can certainly lead to the sinking of submarines, but other accidents have also 
lead to sinking. In one case the reason was an operator error, but in this case the submarine was 
later salvaged. In another a decommissioned first generation submarine with limited buoyancy 
sank while being towed during a storm from its base to the shipyard where it should be 
dismantled. Other accidents could of course also lead to the sinking of a submarine, e.g. 
collisions, but so far this has not been the case. 
 
If a submarine sinks and is not salvaged its content of radioactive materials, e.g. the fission 
products and the transuranium elements of the fuel and activated parts of the reactor, will at some 
point in the future start leaking into the ocean due to corrosion of the salt sea water. From the 
experience so far this leakage is slow and at the same time the activity of the submarines will 
gradually decay. When the activities start to leak, it will, if soluble, leak out in the seawater where 
it will mix with the very large amounts of seawater in the ocean. Sea currents and diffusion will 
disperse the activity.  
 
2.1.5 Other 
This category includes instrumentation failure, propulsion failure – including turbine failures, 
collisions and flooding of the submarine. There have been a number of collisions between 
Russian submarines and other vessels, not the least caused by the rather aggressive US nuclear 
submarines. But since submarines are vessels of war they are built to withstand powerful 
mechanical actions from the outside and consequently collisions will usually not lead to serious 
damage. The case of collision in the table was included because of the large loss of life. It 
involved a collision between a submarine and an oceanographic research vessel where 
compartment 2 in the submarine was completely flooded and resulted in 27 fatalities. Flooding is 
in-leakage of salt water in one of the submarine compartments. Also the incident where the 
decommissioned submarine K-181 was being towed and 9 sailors drowned are included in this 
category.  
 
2.2 Distribution of incidents vs. class of vessel/ vessels in operation 
It may be noted that of the 28 fires, 8 eight occurred in first generation, one in a second 
generation, and one in a third generation submarine. One fire occurred in a submarine of 
unknown class. So the first generation submarines were much more fire prone than the later 
generations.  
 
During the Soviet era the largest nuclear fleet in the world was built. The Soviet submarine fleet 
soon consisted of attack or multi-purpose submarines for attacks on enemy vessels, cruise missile 
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submarines for attacks on enemy convoys or coastal facilities, and strategic or ballistic missile 
submarines for deterrence and – if need be – strategic attacks on enemy territory. In the 1980s 
came the four Kirov class missile cruisers and a fleet command ship all of which were powered 
by twin reactors. The Soviet Navy built an additional three submarines of different designs, of 
which only one vessel of each type was made: Project 645, Papa, and Mike. These prototypes 
may be considered experimental submarines. The Soviet Union also built three types of small, 
deep-water nuclear submarines: Project 10831, the X-ray and the Uniform class. In total, from the 
inception of its naval nuclear program, the Soviet Union/Russia built 255 nuclear propelled 
surface and submersible military vessels, many of which were fitted with two reactors. As of 
early 2005, less than 50 of Russia’s nuclear powered vessels remained in operation. 
 
The distribution of accidents according to submarine class is presented in Table 2.2. From Table 
2.2 it is clearly seen that the risk of accidents has decreased with newer, safer designs. For the 
first generation the number of accidents per submarine built was 0.33, for the second generation 
0.10 and for the third generation 0.07. The submarines with liquid-metal cooled reactors represent 
a special case of advanced technology, which was hardly mature for submarine application when 
used, and this is the reason for the high accident rate, 0.71. The high value for the Mike class is 
due to the fact that only one vessel of this class was built. It should also be noted that many of the 
newer submarine classes, e.g. the Typhoon, the Akula, the Sierra, and the Victor classes, have as 
far as is known not suffered any accidents. It may be noted that of the 34 fires and explosions 30 
occurred in first generation, one in a second generation, and one in a third generation submarine. 
One fire occurred in a submarine of unknown class. So the first generation submarines were much 
more fire prone than the later generations. The type of accident which caused the largest loss of 
life per accident is – hardly surprising – explosions.  
 
Table 2.2 Distribution of Incidents with Russian Nuclear Ships According to Vessel Class 
 
 Submarine vessels Surface vessels 
Type of accident         1. 
gen. 
2. 
gen 
3. 
gen 
LMC Other/ 
unkn. 
Military Civilian  
No. of 
accidents    
Fires and explosions 30 1 1  2   34 
 Explosion  (5)  (1)     (6) 
Criticality                   2 2  1    5 
Reactor system failure          30 2  4 1 1 1 39 
 LOCA (3)   (1) (1)  (1) (6) 
 Leaks/ fuel failure (21)       (21) 
 Coolant solidification    (3)    (3) 
Other 20 9 2 1    32 
 Propulsion/  turbine 
failure            
(3)   (1)    (4) 
 Collision                   (6) (4)      (10) 
 Flooding (5) (3)  (1)    (8) 
Total  82 14 3 6 3 1 1 110 
 Sunken 2 3 1  1  1 (8) 
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Figure 2.1 Distribution of incidents vs. time 
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Here too the number of accidents is quite significant, one to two per submarine built. In particular 
it seems that the Hotel class was quite accident prone. 
 
 
2.3 Distribution of incidents and class of vessel vs. time of incident and 
operating experience 
 
The distribution of the 110 incidents between 1959 and 2004 is presented in figure 2.2. We see 
that a large number of accidents occurred in the period from the start of the submarine program 
until the end of 1980. The steep fall in absolute numbers was probably due to considerable 
reduced sailing time for the Russian submarine fleet due to economical constraints. However, if  
 
 
Figure 2.2 Distribution of Incidents with Russian Nuclear Ships According to Time of 
Accident and Number of Nuclear-propelled Vessels in Operation 
 
 
considering the number of accidents vs. the number of vessels in operation, the picture is 
considerable different.  
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The relative number of incidents has steadily decreased from a very difficult initial phase until 
present. When considering the nature of the incidents after 2000, this reveals several 
extraordinary incidents such as collisions between Russian vessels or between US and Russian 
vessels. These are incidents less serious, if considering possible releases, than the multiple reactor 
accidents in the first two decades of the operation of a nuclear fleet. 
 
It is seen from Table 2.1 that the number of accidents, also taken per number of operational 
submarines, is quite significant. It might be expected that the number of accidents per submarine 
in operation would have decreased with time as experience with this type of vessel was gained, 
and this trend is obvious in figure 2.2. However, this is the general trend, for the first generation 
of Russian submarines, the trend was initial downwards, however, it started to increase again after 
10-15 years. The overall average still decreased due to the massive introduction of new and 
modern submarines with a considerable lower absolute incident rate and also relative incident rate 
pr. submarine in operation.  
 
When evaluating the distribution of accidents as a function of time the number of operational 
nuclear vessels during the decades considered in Table 2.1 should also be taken into account since 
a larger number of ships are likely to increase the number of accidents. On the other side, the 
increased experience with the operation of nuclear ships and new and safer designs should reduce 
the risk. That this is so is demonstrated in Table 2.1. During the first decade considered the 
number of accidents was high, nine, while at that time the Soviet nuclear Navy was still of modest 
size (about 40 vessels). In addition, at this time more emphasis may well have been placed on 
rapid build-up of the Soviet nuclear Navy than on safety due to the cold war. During the next two 
decades the number of accidents are 12 (about 130 vessels) and 14 (about 195 vessels), still high, 
but – taken per operating nuclear vessel - decreasing. The reason for this is presumably new and 
safer submarine designs and more operational experience. However, looking at the reasons for the 
accidents it is clear that the safety culture of the Soviet nuclear Navy was not impressive. During 
the 1990es (about 130 operational vessels) the number of accidents was low due to safer designs, 
due to a reduced number of operational submarines and due to reduced operation with the nuclear 
vessels because of lack of funds.  
     
It is hardly surprising that the most dangerous accident is the sinking of a submarine. In the case 
considered here it was actually a fire that caused the sinking. However, criticality accidents, fires, 
explosions and loss-of-cooling accidents (LOCA) are also quite dangerous. Three of the “Reactor 
system leak” were probably LOCA’s since in two cases the reactor compartment and in one the 
reactor core were replaced. It may be mentioned that regarding collisions in most cases very little 
happens since submarines are built to operate under war conditions and therefore to withstand 
rather violent actions like depth charges. The 27 killed in collisions all were killed in the same 
accident. 
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3 Inventory of radionuclides in Russian naval vessels 
During the operation of nuclear submarines the nuclei of the fissile material of the reactor cores, 
235U, undergo fission, whereby highly radioactive fission products are produced. Transuranium 
elements will also be produced though to a significantly smaller extent. It is these radionuclides 
that may be released to the environment in connection with accidents of naval vessels.  
 
The radionuclide inventory might be divided into four parts: 1) noble gases, 2) fission products, 
3) transuranic elements, and 4) other. The latter contain in this connection activation products in 
structure materials and reactor coolant isotopes in cladding and structure materials. When 
considering the risk for criticality, the inventory and geometry of transuranic elements is of vital 
importance. However, as the transuranic elements often are less soluble than fission products, the 
latter group are considered more interesting for marine and atmospheric releases. The fission 
products have in addition other properties related to the uptake mechanisms in nature that makes 
them especially relevant for any impact assessment involving spent nuclear fuel. This group 
might be divided into several groups denoted by the main characteristic isotopes in the group; 
iodine (131I), caesium (137Cs) and strontium (90Sr).  
 
The amount of fission products produced is proportional to the number of grams of 235U that has 
undergone fission in the reactor core, which again is proportional to the integrated power 
production of the core, the so-called burn-up. The burn-up is usually measured in Mega-Watt-
days or MWd. 1 g of 235U destroyed through fission corresponds roughly to the production of 1 
MWd of thermal energy in the reactor core, however, this ratio should be calculated for the 
system in question.  
 
The basis for assessing the inventory of transuranic and other elements as given above is the 
reactor design including fuel enrichment and composition. The fission products depend primarily 
on the reactor power operation histories, however, to a limited extent also on design information. 
The reactor design and fuel inventory are discussed in [Reistad] and will be summarized below 
before the discussion of power operation histories and core inventories. 
 
 
3.1 Methods  
In this report, HELIOS – a detailed reactor physics transport and burn-up code developed and 
supported by Studsvik Scandpower – has been applied to identify the inventory. HELIOS has 
many applications and is presently used by a number of research laboratories, nuclear power 
utilitiy companies and engineering companies in various countries [Casal]. HELIOS is 
characterised by its geometric flexibility allowing calculations of fuel designs, such as that of 
naval reactors, which differ considerably from conventional power reactor fuel.  
 
Reactor physics concerns the prediction of the ‘neutronic’ behaviour of configurations intended 
as reactors of neutron chain reactions, in this case, of ship propulsion reactors based on fission in 
uranium. The reactor physics methods of HELIOS include descriptions of the fission process, the 
interaction of neutrons with the various materials in the reactor core such as capture, elastic and 
inelastic scattering, fission, and so forth, in terms of ‘slowing down’, ’thermalization’, ‘resonance 
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absorption’ and ‘neutron transport’. The primary objective is to solve a set of equations 
describing these phenomena, resulting in a detailed space/energy neutron distribution within the 
considered system. Characteristic parameters, such as k∞, are then easily calculated. 
 
In more precise terms, HELIOS is a 2-D transport theory program for fuel burn-up and gamma-
flux calculation. It solves the neutron and gamma transport equations in a general, 2-D geometry 
bounded by a ‘polygon’ of straight lines. The surrounding medium is described in terms of given 
boundary conditions. The system to be calculated may be subdivided into a large number of ‘flat 
flux’ regions or space meshes to support the numerical solution. Material properties may be 
assigned freely to any mesh. The geometric description of the system is user input controlled; 
thus almost any fuel cell, fuel assembly or larger areas of a reactor core may be described. 
Typical applications include BWR, PWR, VVER, CANDU and various test reactor fuel 
assemblies or larger core regions [Hark]. However, due to the inherent flexibility of HELIOS, 
other reactor types (such as the ship reactors studied in this report) may be treated with the same 
accuracy as the more common applications. 
 
The isotopic properties with respect to neutron and gamma interaction are contained in a ‘nuclear 
data library’ derived from ENDF/B-VI [Brookhaven].  271 different isotopes and ‘mixtures’ are 
included. The energy dependence of the nuclear data is accounted for by means of group theory. 
The entire energy range (0 - 10 MeV neutron energy) is subdivided into a certain number of 
energy groups. Energy averaged data are used within each group. Several energy group structures 
are possible in HELIOS. There are separate energy group structures for neutron and gamma 
spectra. The HELIOS library has three available group structures: 34/18, 89/18 and 190/48 
neutron/gamma energy groups, respectively. The multigroup transport equations are solved 
directly in the energy group structure of the library. The 34/18 groups library is used in most 
applications and also in this report.  
 
HELIOS has been extensively qualified by comparisons with experimental data and international 
benchmark problems for reactor physics codes as well as through feedback from applications 
[Stamm`ler]. Some of these benchmarks include fuel enrichments up to 90% [Perry]. 
 
 
3.2 Reactor and core design  
The considerations described in this chapter, mainly taken from NKS Report 1 as referred to in 
the foreword, has provided the arguments for the input parameters in the inventory calculations as 
given in Table 3.1 below. 
 
The operation of the different marine reactors connects directly to the development of vessels and 
the hostile climate in the cold war. In the development of Russian marine reactor systems, two 
specific avenues have been pursued: (1) civilian reactor systems with conventional designs and 
materials, (2) military reactor systems, much less transparent, but with more advanced 
technologies and materials. The development of military naval reactors soon branched into two 
separate tracks: water-cooled and water-moderated reactors vs. liquid-metal-cooled reactors 
(without moderations using intermediate neutrons) 
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From the very beginning, the main feature of both civilian and the military systems was the use of 
two identical reactors in each vessel – in contrast to US nuclear submarines, where one reactor 
was considered sufficient. Given the limited operation of the first generation of Russian 
submarines outside Russian coastal waters, the use of two reactors seems to be a measure of 
deliberate operational redundancy. This is a logical consequence when one recalls the many 
failures experienced in the first decades of submarine reactor operation, as also stated in Russian 
scientific sources. This in turn might have been a consequence of the lack of testing of these early 
versions of the military reactors. 
 
Since the Kurchatov Institute has played an important role in the design of pressurized water 
reactors for both naval and icebreaking vessels, it seems reasonable to assume that the general 
designs were probably quite similar. On this basis the assumption was made that the design of 
fuel assemblies in the first generation of submarine reactors was similar in naval vessels and in 
icebreakers: however, the validity of this is hard to judge. However, the overall tendencies for the 
civilian program should apply to the military realm as well, even if there are distinct differences 
between important elements in the civilian and military technology.  
 
The first civilian marine propulsion system installed in the icebreaker Lenin was based on low-
enriched ceramic fuel, uranium dioxide, in Zr-cladding. The amounts of U-235 varied from 75 to 
85 kg, 5% enriched. Apparently, there was a need to improve the cladding, as several other types 
of cladding were introduced as part of the second fuel load for the reactor, at least stainless steel 
and Zr-Nb alloy. After the accident with Lenin in 1967, important developments were identified, 
and today the icebreakers use a uranium-zirconium alloy as fuel in Zr-cladding.  The precise 
amount of fuel is not known except for the freighter Sevmorput, where the safety report specifies 
150.7 kg. enriched to 90% as one fuel load. The changes can be summarized as follows: 
 
• Increased amount of fuel in the core (from 80 kg to 150.7 kg. U-235) and increased 
enrichment levels (from 5% to 90%) 
• improved heat-transfer characteristics (from ceramic – UO-2 – to metal fuel – U-Zr  
alloy); 
 
Regarding the number of fuel pins pr. Assembly, no data, except for 36 in the first icebreakers 
reactors, has been noted in public sources. In total, this accounts for improved output with regard 
to reactor power, 90 to 171 MWt, and optimalization of the operational characteristics, as the 
number of reactors was reduced from two to one. As seen, safety provisions were also 
dramatically increased from OK-150 to OK-900. 
 
Russia started developing submarine reactors in 1952, about the same time as the civilian marine 
reactor program was initiated. For the PWR platform, an alumina-based metal fuel was 
developed. The use of two reactors compensated for the low-enriched uranium used in the fuel. 
Changes here can be summarized in the same way as for the civilian sphere: 
 
• increased amount of fuel in the core (from 30 kg to possibly 200 kg. U-235) and 
increased enrichment levels (6% to 45%); 
• increased number of fuel pins pr. assembly and increased number of assemblies in the 
core (180–280 – presumably even higher for third-generation submarines); 
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• different fuel compositions and cladding materials (U-Al with stainless steel cladding, 
unknown matrix with zirconium cladding) 
 
 
As the composition and geometry of the submarine fuel are rarely made public, it is hard to 
evaluate whether and how the heat-transfer characteristics of submarine fuel have been improved. 
It is reasonable to assume, however, that considerable effort has been devoted to this. The 
strategies have possibly been to improve heat production capabilities by increasing the amount of 
metal and the heat-producing area in the fuel matrix. The latter implies employing other fuel 
shapes than rods, for example plate fuel as used in US submarines or advanced geometries based 
on the rod shape, e.g. hollow pins, extremely small pins, use of fins, etc. 
 
A pertinent question when considering enrichment levels in Russian submarines is why higher 
levels have not been used in order to boost the operational properties of the submarines – 
improving overall economy by reducing re-fueling operations to zero, as the US Navy has 
achieved, and reducing the time the submarine is not operational at sea. The explanation might lie 
in the inherent inertia in the Russian military-industrial complex and the absence of financial 
constraints in military spending until fairly recently. Under conditions of the same societal laws 
as in the West, one might expect to see future Russian submarines consisting of one single reactor 
with highly enriched fuel.  
 
 
Table 3.1 Relevant design parameters for inventory calculations with certain fuel and reactor 
geometries 
 
 Icebreakers Submarines 
 OK-150 
 (1. gen) 
KLT-40  
(3. gen) 
VM-A 
(1. gen) 
OK 650  
(3. gen) 
Core configuration “Lenin” “Sevmorput” “Lenin” “Sevmorput” 
Amount of fuel 
(235U) 
80 150,7 50 200 
Fuel type UO2 U-Al U-Al U-Al 
Enrichment (%) 5 90 20 45 
 
 
 
3.3 Reactor power operation histories  
The burn-up at the time of the accident may vary between zero and maximum burn-up. While the 
first submarine vessels usually had a low burn-up, as for example shown when considering the 
inventory of the dumped reactors, the more modern submarines could be operated in much longer 
periods and thereby giving larger relative content of fission products in the reactors as a result.  
  
The operation of the first design of the Russian icebreaker Lenin has been carefully documented, 
and to a certain extent this is the case with the more modern icebreaker generations. However, the 
modus operandi differs considerably from the submarines. 
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Table 3.2 Operational parameters for Russian icebreakers and submarines 
 
 1. 
generation
2. generation 3.  generation 
Type of 
reactor 
OK-150 OK-
900 
OK 900 A KLT 40 
Vessel 
name 
Lenin Ark-
tika 
Sibir Russia Soviet 
Union
Yamal Taimyr Vaigatch Sevmor-
put 
Operating 
period 
1958 - 
1966 
1970  
-  
1989 
1975 
 - 
1977 
 - 
1992 
1985 
 - 
1990 
- 
1993 
 - 
1989 
 - 
1990  
- 
1989  
- 
Yearly 
average 
operating 
period 
- 3 230 
 
235 232 208 273 298 300 288 275 
Total 
energy 
produced 
by the 
reactor 
(GWh) 4 
- 5 6523/ 
6398 
9378/ 
8502 
6095/ 
6934 
5073/ 
5270 
4134/ 
4071 
2244/ 
2917 
5609 5467 3744 
Number 
of 
reloadings 
(each 
reactor) 
1/ 1/ 1 5/ 6 
 
5/ 4 2/ 3 2/ 2 1/ 1 1/1 2 2 1 
Average 
energy 
produced 
pr. 
reloading 
(MWd) 
-5 45298/ 
38083 
 
65125/ 
70850
84652/ 
72229
70458/ 
73194
86125/ 
84813
46750/ 
60770
77902 75930 78000 
Average 
operating 
level 
(MWt)5 
-/ 0,59/ -  0,35/ 
0,36 
0,38/ 
0,35 
0,53/ 
0,46 
0, 39/ 
0,41 
0,37/ 
0,36 
0,26/ 
0,34 
0,43 0,45 0,38 
 
 
Icebreakers – all generations 
 
The first generation of civilian Russian marine reactors consists of one vessel, Lenin, using the 
reactor OK-150. The first operating period, 1959-62, resulted in burn-up values for the three 
reactor cores from 17800-18000 MWd [Afrikantov]. The second operating period, 1963-65, 
resulted in burn-up values in the range of 17500-22500 MWd for the three reactors. In February 
1965 a melt-down occurred as a result of drainage of N2, one of the three reactors (as described in 
Annex I), and the fuel could only be partly removed from the reactor. This accident gave the final 
                                                          
3 For the first reactor system in Lenin, only data on specific periods for specific reactors are available. Due 
to the lack of accuracy, global average figures for the complete operating period from 1959-65 has been 
calculated. 
4 Time period from the moment of installation on the ship (GWh) (commissioning) till the year 2000. 
5 In per cent of reactor power capacity. 
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impetus for a full replacement of the reactor compartment, then introducing OK-900 as a 
replacement for OK-150, which was further developed to OK-900 A. 
 
The need for the icebreaker to operate with great flexibility led to a search for ways and means 
how to increase the burn-up of the reactor cores. The operation of second and third generation of 
icebreakers was based on the fact that the first cores, then probably the OK-900, reactors “could 
produce an energy of 0.7-0.9 million MWh” [Makarov], while “they now can produce 2.1-2.3 
million MWh” [Makarov]. This corresponds to a burn in the area 29100 – 37500 MWd for the 
first cores (OK-900), and 87500 – 95100 MWd for the present cores. With a nominal power on 
171 MWt, the latter corresponds for the first cores to 170 – 218 full power days.  
 
Based on [Makarov], basic operating parameters for the nuclear powered icebreakers and cargo 
ship from 1970 to 1999 have been summarized in table 3.1. 
 
Submarines - first generation 
 
In [Barinov] it is assumed that the reactor of a first generation submarine operates for 40,000 
hours at full power with two refuelings before decommissioning. According to [Elatomtsev] the 
power level of first generation reactors was 72 MWt, so that the burn-up per core becomes 40,000 
MWd. However, when considering the actual power operating histories for first generation 
submarines, these figures seems to overestimate the burn-up and thereby the inventory of 
medium-lived isotopes like Cs-137 Sr-90 and the transuraniums. 
 
Figure 3.1 # operational days for all November submarines 
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For the first generation of Russian submarines, the burn-up might be reconstructed using 
available data in Figure 3.1-3.4 for the submarine models in question. We see that all models 
November, Hotel, Echo I and II all have been operating with a global average of about 1000 days, 
the including 1 or even 2 fuel changes. The underlying figures show that the operating history 
depend mostly on the experiencing with accidents since almost all of the vessels experienced 
some kind of accidents that required extensive maintenance. Refueling was often performed in 
conjunction with accidents repairs.  
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If considering that most of the operating history might be assumed to be at an average level of 
25% of full power and one refueling, this would result in the following 8750 MWd as the average 
fuel burn-up (500 power days, 25% of full power). More conservative estimates have been 
presented in the relevant literature (750 power days, 40% of full power, i. e. 21000 MWd pr. 
core), but this seems less relevant taking the actual operational data presented in this report into 
account. When considering power operating histories for Russian submarines of first generations, 
the conservative estimate seems reasonable only for very few submarines, possibly only K-5 and 
K-74 as seen in figure 3.1 and 3.4. These submarines are decommissioned already. 
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Figure 3.2 # operational days for all Hotel submarines 
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Figure 3.3 # operational days for all Echo I submarines 
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Figure 3.4 # operational days for all Echo II submarines  
 
 
 
Submarines - second generation 
Regarding second generation submarines, the overall reactor power level increased from 70 MWt 
in the first generation to 90 MWt. Second generation vessels have also been involved in much 
fewer accidents that the first generation, often resulting in change of fuel or even the complete 
reactor compartment. As noted, reactor failure including fuel leaks has reported to be a major 
problem in the first generation Russian submarine reactors, however, the same problems has not 
been reported for the second generation or seen as a result of the accident evaluation. This might 
indicate larger burn-up values for this generation vessels, in this study 50% increase in the 
number of power days has been chosen as the basis for inventory calculations, resulting in a 
doubling of burn-up values (750 power days, 25% of full power) from the first generation, to 
16875 MWd. This is corresponding to [Bakin], suggesting 17 000 MWd per core. More 
conservative estimates, in line with similar assumptions for first generation submarines, would be 
1000 power days at 40% of full power, i. e. 36 000 MWd pr. core, as a maximum.  
 
Submarines - third generation 
The overall reactor power level for third generation submarines was probably nearly doubled 
compared with the second generation; from 90 MWt to 190 MWt. Regarding operational uses, 
this was substantially reduced after Soviet Union broke into parts and the Russian financial crises 
started in the beginning of the 90-ties. A sharp reduction in the number of operational days at sea 
has to be expected; however, on the other hand improved fuel behaviour might increase the 
potential burn-up for one single core. Taking the limited number of vessels belonging to the third 
generation into account, we have to calculate burn-up values based on the number of days in 
operation pr. year and the days in operation each year. While several vessels have virtually been 
decommissioned after 1990 due to lack of resources for their operation, the oldest vessels has 
been systematically decommissioned as new vessels have been put into operation. A reasonable 
value for operational activity should be 50 days every 18 months to reflect the economical crises 
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in the Russian navy. With a maximum operational period on 17 years, average 15 years, for any 
vessel of third generation, this corresponds to burn-up value (750:power days/ 1,5 (operational 
factor), 25% of full power) 23750 MWd. A similar conservative estimate as for the other 
generations of Russian submarines, with a lower operational factor, approximately 1, and 
increased power output to 30% of maximum power, the burn-up would be approximately 42000 
MWd for a period of 15 years, an average maximum value. These values have been used for 
inventory calculations for third generation submarines being the largest military vessel considered 
in this report. 
 
 
3.4 Core inventory – fission products 
Based on the design properties and the survey of operational characteristics, a radionuclide 
inventory for the different civilian marine reactors types has been calculated as part of this project 
(se Annex II for example complete set of isotopes), also including short-lived isotopes, in 
addition to the long-lived fission products and actinides discussed below.  
 
Important for the production of a given fission product is the yield of that particular nuclide in the 
fission process. Fission produces in addition to the neutron emitted two fission products, the light 
and the heavy fission product. The fission products with the highest yield are those with mass 
numbers in the range of 85-105, the light, and of 130-150, the heavy. The total yield of fission 
products with a given mass number A may be obtained from the fission yield curves with the 
characteristic double hump. The yield of the fission products at the top of the humps is around 
6%.  
 
Fission products with a given A are produced with different atomic numbers or Z-values. Since 
they are all neutron rich nuclei they will undergo β-decay until they are transformed into the same 
stable nucleus. In less than 1% of the decays the so-called delayed neutrons will be emitted, but 
they will be ignored in this context. An example of such a series of β-decays of fission product is 
 
BaBaCsXeITeSbSn m 13756
137
56
137
55
137
54
137
53
137
52
137
51
137
50 →→→→→→→  
 
where 137Ba is the stable end-nucleus. On the average a fission product formed in the fission 
process will undergo about 3½ β-decays before becoming a stable nucleus. In the series given 
above, 46% of the fission products will start their decay chain at 137Xe, 45% at 137I and 7% at 
137Te and 2% at 137Cs. These yields may be obtained from the literature, e.g. [Meek], or they may 
be calculated by use of a theoretical distribution function. It should be noted that all fission 
products of A=137 will pass 137Cs which has a much longer half-life than all of the others. In 
general the half-life of the fission products become the larger, the closer the nucleus is to the 
stable nucleus, but there are exceptions, e.g. 137mBa. 
 
50-60% of the fission products produced has half-lives of seconds or less. About 75-80% have 
half-lives of minutes or less and about 85-90% have half-lives of hours or less. But about 5% 
have half-lives of years. Some of these have very long half-lives, 105 years or more, and the 
activity of these fission products is therefore quite small. 
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The long-lived fission products are usually formed with a Z-value 1 or 2 less than the 
corresponding stable nuclei, into which they will ultimately transform. This means that all fission 
products with a lower Z will rapidly transform into the long-lived fission product. Therefore, it is 
a reasonable assumption that the long-lived fission products are formed immediately after fission 
with the full yield of all fission products,γ, with the given mass number. 
 
The number of fissions produced in a reactor per unit time, Nf, is 
 
f
f E
PN =  
where P is the power level of the reactor and Ef is the total energy produced per fission, about 200 
MeV. If P is measured in MW, Nf becomes 
 
PN f
16101.3=  
Here Nf is the number of fissions per second. With the assumptions made above the number of a 
given long-lived fission product in the reactor, Nfp, is obtained by the following differential 
equation: 
fpfpf
fp NN
dt
dN λγ −=  
 
where γ is the total yield of fission products with the mass number of the long-lived fission 
product considered  and λfp its  decay constant. It is here assumed that there will be no neutron 
capture in the fission products. The solution to this equation is  
 [ ]t
fp
f
fp
fpe
N
N λλ
γ −−= 1  
 
and the activity of the long-lived fission product is 
 [ ]tffpfp fpeNN λγλ −−= 1  
 
The activity of the long-lived fission product considered a period τ after final shut-down is 
 
 
 
By use of this formula the activity of a number of long-lived fission products was calculated and 
compared to the values given in [Pologikh3] and [Lystsov]. In the calculation it was assumed that 
t=50 000 h, τ=3 yr, and that the burn-up was 42 000 MWd. The yields of [Meek] were used. The 
results of the calculations are presented in Table 4.1 together with the results from calculations 
using HELIOS completed as described in the next chapter. 
 
Table 3.3 Activities of Long-lived Fission Products in Spent Naval Fuel 
 
[ ] τλλγλ fpfp eeNN tffpfp −−−= 1
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Nuclide λ γ Theoretical Calculations Pologikh Lystsov 
 (s-1) (%) (PBq) (PBq) (PBq) (PBq) 
90Sr  7.63 10-10 5.92 4.22 3,88 4.15 4.2 
106Ru 2.18 10-8 0.392 0.29 0,23 0.32  
137Cs 7.28 10-10 6.26 4.29 4,03 4.9 4.4 
144Ce  2.83 10-8 5.46 2.24 1,36 2.3  
147Pm  8.39 10-9 2.28 4.81 2,45 6.3  
 
Since the calculations of [Lystsov] were performed on the basis of a burn-up of 21,000 MWd, his 
activity values were increased by a factor of two. The agreement found is quite good. Note also, 
that the decay of 90Sr is followed by the decay of 90Y which has a much shorter half-life than 90Sr, 
so that the activity of 90Y is very nearly the same as that of 90Sr. The same is true for 106Ru and 
106Rb, 137Cs and 137mBa and 144Ce and 144Pr. When considering the fission product with longer 
half-life, the calculations for submarine inventory show that it is formed about 1 PBq of 137Cs and 
90Sr for every 10 GWd in burn-up. 
 
 
3.5 Core inventory – transuranic isotopes 
The production of transuranium element depends on the burn-up, on the enrichment of the fuel 
and on the reactor design. Since Russian submarines normally use quite highly enriched uranium, 
20 – 90%, the production of transuranium elements is limited. In this chapter, results of 
calculations of transuranium inventory for selected vessels are presented with a brief introduction 
of transuranium production process in reactors. 
 
Transuranium elements are produced by the following processes. Neutron capture in 235U will in 
about 15% lead to the production of 236U. The half-life of   236U is long, 2.3 107 year and its 
thermal absorption cross section is small, about 5 barn, but neutron capture will produce some 
237U which will rapidly decay into 237Np (T½=6.8 d). 237Np has a long half-life (T½= 2.1 106 year), 
but a reasonable large absorption cross section (170 b), and neutron capture leads to production of 
238Np, which will rapidly decay into 238Pu (T½=2.1 d). 238Pu has a half-life of about 88 years and it 
is one of transuranium elements, which will occur in burned submarine fuel. 
 
Neutron capture in 238U will produce 239U, which rapidly is transformed into 239Pu after two β-
decays. Neutron capture in 239Pu will usually cause fission, but in some cases 240Pu is formed. 
Neutron capture in 240Pu produces 241Pu, which relatively rapidly (T½=14 yr) decays into 241Am.  
 
Icebreaker reactors 
 
From [Pologikh3] and [Lystsov] the following values for the activity of some transuranium 
elements in a submarine core that has a burn up of about 40 000 MWd can be obtained. These 
values are given in Table 3.4.  
 
The Lystsov values have been corrected for a lower burn-up. From the table it is seen that he 
activity of the transuranium elements in submarine fuel is most cases several orders of magnitude 
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Table 3.4 Transuranium Elements in Spent Fuel 
 
Nuclide Pologikh3   (TBq) Lystsov(TBq) Calculations (TBq) 
238Pu 41 26  
239Pu 6.5 6.6  
240Pu 4.1   
241Pu 1100   
241Am 11   
 
lower than that of the long-lived fission products. However, the transuranium elements listed are 
α-emitters except for 241Pu, which is a β-emitter.  
 
 
 
Figure 3.5 Amount of 241Am (GBq) as a function of burn-up (MWd) and decay (days) 
for reactor fueled with 8% enriched (235U) U-Al alloy 
 
 
 
An example of the relative importance of actinides is spent fuel from decommissioned Russian 
submarine reactors. Since the reactors of the first generation of Russian submarines have not been 
in operation for years, no short-lived isotopes will be left in the fuel. Because of the production of 
Pu, the production of 241Am as seen in figure 3.5, continues up to a level of 10 TBq 30 years after 
the reactor has been shut off. Many of the Russian submarines of first and second generation will 
reach this level the coming five to ten years, and cause increased difficulties in the handling of the 
spent fuel. A criteria used for evaluating the self-protectiveness of irradiated nuclear fuel, is that 
the dose rate at 1 meter unshielded is below 100 R/hour. In case of the Russian spent marine  fuel, 
the dominating radiation sources are 137Cs and – to some extent – 241Am and other actinides. After 
100000 days, or 30 years, one fuel assembly will no longer be self-protecting but the radiation 
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level will not be more than one decade below the limit mentioned. However, certain operation 
histories might give other results, in IAEA (1996) also shorter burn up than used in figure 3.5 are 
registered for certain reactors, for example there have been several incidents where the reactor has 
had to be replaced because of accidents. These cores, which are stored at the bases in the 
Northern or in the Pacific area, must be given high priority in the efforts to secure the spent fuel. 
 
Submarine reactors 
 
This part is divided into three parts: A) the amounts and quality of 239Pu, B) the amount and 
enrichment of 235U, and C) the amount of fission products and actinides in the spent fuel. The 
thermal power has been varied from 20 MW to 90 MW, but with no significant effect on the 
amounts of material in focus for this paper. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.6 Ratio of quantity (g) of each Pu-isotope to the total quantity of Pu vs. burn-up 
(MWd) for a naval reactor with 50 kg. initial 235U enriched to 20% 
 
 
For light enriched fuel (5% and 7.5%) one can observe a substantial production of Pu compared 
to the other cases. As seen from figure 3.6, in a core with 50 kg 235U, initially enriched to 5%, up 
to 3.5 kg 239Pu can be produced. The calculations show that the kef is going below 1 about the 
same time as the consumption rate of Pu exceeds the production rate, i.e. at the time of fuel 
change. Moreover, modestly enriched uranium fuel give significant positive results in the context 
of nonproliferation considering the amount produced of 239Pu, and in case the fuel is enriched to 
10%, less than 2 kg 239Pu is produced in the core with an initial load of 50 kg 235U. In case of the 
low and modestly enriched spent fuel, the amount of Pu in each assembly with the reactor and 
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fuel data proposed, will be in the area of 0,02- 0,011 kg. In a fully burned submarine reactor the 
quality of the Pu will similar to the quality of Pu in commercial reactor fuel as seen in figure 3.7: 
with about 60% 239Pu and a substantial proportion of 240Pu and 241Pu, which make the fuel not 
very attractive to handle. It should be emphasized however, that the plutonium quality in a  
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Figure 3.7 Amount of 239Pu (kg) vs. burn-up (MWd) in Russian spent naval (UOx and 
UAlx) - first generation submarine with 50 to 70 kg 235U initial fuel load. 
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Figure 3.8 Amount of 235U (kg) vs. burn-up (MWd) in Russian spent naval fuel (UOx and UAlx) - 
first and second generation submarine with 50 kg - 70 kg 235U initial fuel load 
 
half burned out reactor core, can be more than 80% 239Pu.  As seen from figure 3.7, as much as 2-
3 kg 239Pu may be produced in one half burned reactor core. The fuel composition has no 
significant effect on the Pu-content, as observed in figure 3.7 for similar initial conditions for fuel 
uranium oxide and uranium aluminium alloy. In case 2, with fuel enriched to 20%, the content of 
Pu gets less important. In a reactor with 20% initial enrichment of 235U (initial load of 50 kg 235U), 
the largest content in one core will be less than 1.1 kg. The quality of the Pu in this case continues 
to be like the quality of Pu in commercial reactor fuel, however, with a 10% higher share of 239Pu, 
and a similar lower share of the other Pu-isotopes. 
 
The amount of 235U in this case for the different enrichment levels follows a similar development 
as it decreases from the initial quantity. There are insignificant differences between fuel loads 
with different initial enrichment as seen in figure 3.8. The effects of higher initial content of 235U 
are seen to be important for how long to burn the reactor. While the content of 235U after 
operation for a reactor with enriched fuel to 20% and 50 kg initial load of 235U, decreases to 30-40 
kg pr. core, or 0,17-0,22 kg pr. fuel assembly, the final enrichment in 235U end up at 7-12%.  
 
 
 
3.6 Overall inventory – submarine and icebreaker vessels 
Regarding all relevant reactors, average burn-up values as presented in chapter 3.2 have been 
chosen in the modelling of fission inventory. The calculations have been based on two different 
geometries and fuel materials:  
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A. The “Lenin” configuration (uraniumdiokside, circular fuel pins and assembly, 
hexagonal): Lenin, first generation submarine; 
B. The “Sevmorput” configuration: (uranium metal (U-Al), circular fuel pins and assembly, 
hexagonal): second and third generation icebreaker, second and third generation 
submarine 
 
The main difference in the model configurations used for the calculations below is related to the 
enrichment level and the amount of fuel material in the reactors, ranging from 50 kg. (U-235)/ 
20% in the first generation submarines to 150,7 kg (U-235)/ 90% (third generation icebreaker) to 
200 kg (U-235)/ 45% (third generation submarine). 
 
 
Table 3.5 Summary of operational data and radionuclide inventory calculated for different types 
of Russian marine reactors – decay time: 0,1 day 
 
 Icebreakers Submarines 
 OK-150  
(1. gen) 
KLT-40  
(3. gen) 
VM-A 
(1. gen) 
OK 650  
(3. gen) 
Burn (MWd) 
(average) 
142006 78000 8750 23750 
Burn-up (MWd/ 
t iHM7) 
8875 465826 35000 53491 
Days of oper. pr. 
year 
-5 275 50 33 
Fission products (Bq) 
90Sr  1,58E+15 8,68E+15 8,71E+14 2,34E+15 
137Cs 1,69E+15 8,83E+15 8,91E+14 2,40E+15 
106Ru 5,14E+15 5,41E+15 4,13E+14 8,19E+14 
144Ce  4,67E+16 6,55E+16 4,83E+15 9,78E+15 
147Pm  5,38E+15 1,45E+16 1,40E+15 2,80E+15 
Transuranic elements (Bq) 
239Pu 9,88E+12 7,50E+11 1,26E+12 3,18E+12 
240Pu 2,99E+12 1,05E+12 3,46E+11 1,00E+12 
241Pu 3,48E+14 3,20E+14 1,98E+13 9,52E+13 
241Am 6,08E+10 6,00E+11 6,83E+10 5,22E+11 
242Pu 5,27E+08 4,16E+09 3,03E+07 1,38E+08 
 
The amount of actinides, than considering the fissile material in particular, in Russian submarines 
of first and second generation is naturally primarily dependent on the initial loading of 235U in the 
reactor and the burn-up. With 50 kg initial load of 235U enriched to 20%, and operation to the 
limit of the fuel in the reactor, the content of 235U might be reduced to 27 kg in case of high burn-
up. The enrichment is then reduced to 10%, and the Pu produced is 1.1 kg. For a reactor with 
substantially lower enrichment, 5% in 235U, however, with the same initial amount of 235U, again 
considering an operating history lasting until keff goes below one, the content of 235U will be 26 
kg, enriched to 3%, but with a Pu content on 3.4 kg. The perhaps most plausible reactor and fuel 
                                                          
6 [Sivintsev], p. 11. 
7 iHM = initial heavy metal (in metric tons). 
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data set for the largest number of submarines, 20% enriched fuel with 50 kg initial load of 235U, 
give a core content of 239Pu on 1.6 kg, or 0.029 kg pr. fuel assembly. 
 
A short burn-up gives reasons to concentrate on the content of 137Cs, while in the opposite case, 
the 241Am will dominate after several hundred years, as for commercial power fuel. For low 
enriched submarine fuel the proliferation concern is associated with plutonium.  For high 
enriched fuel the concern is associated with 235U and crude uranium.  
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4 Release Properties for Various Accidents 
 
The emphasis has been put on identification of possible releases of radioactivity as being the main 
focus of this report. The two main scenarios for contact between the surrounding environment and 
the radioactivity in the fuel, are: 
 
1. Deliberate removal of all barriers between fuel and environment and subsequent 
accidents, i. e. refueling/ defueling; 
2. Undeliberate removal of all barriers between fuel and environment as a result of an 
accident; 
 
The main preliminary conclusion regarding source-term relevant submarine accidents which may 
give rise to release of radioactive materials must directly or indirectly involve the reactor and the 
primary circuit. The accidents that affect the reactor system directly are criticality accidents and 
loss-of-cooling accidents (including solidification accidents). Regarding the first scenario, a 
special emphasis has been put on criticality incidents which have occurred at several instances, 
where no barriers are in place for preventing mitigation of radionuclides in case of an accident. 
Accidents with nuclear weapons on board the submarines are not considered in this context.  
 
 
4.1 Criticality Accidents 
During a criticality accident the reactor becomes unintentionally supercritical, a significant 
amount of energy is produced in the associated power excursion and this energy will destroy 
some or most of the fuel and part of the reactor system. It may also eject fuel particles and 
radioactive steam and water droplets into the surrounding areas.   
 
Criticality accidents are unlikely to occur during normal operation of reactors since during this 
period the flux monitoring and the control systems are operational. These systems will shut down 
the reactor, should the reactor for some reason become supercritical. However, when the 
submarine is at a shipyard for repair, refueling and/or tests, the safety systems may not be in 
operation, when control rods or fuel elements are moved and a criticality accident may occur. 
Such an accident is in particular dangerous if it occurs during re- or defueling, when the 
submarine hull has been opened and there is free access from the reactor tank to the environment. 
 
The release of activity in connection with a criticality accident consists primarily of fission 
products. There are two sources of fission products; those present in the fuel prior to the accident 
and those produced during the power excursion caused by the accident. 
 
4.1.1 Fissions produced during the power excursion 
The number of fissions produced during the power excursion depends on a number of factors, e.g. 
the degree of supercriticality achieved and the speed with which it is added. It has for submarine 
reactors has been estimated by a number of authors: 
 
 [Lystsov]:   about 1018 fissions 
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 [Sivintsev]:  about 5 1018 fissions 
 [Pologikh2]:  about 1019 fissions 
 [Oelgaard2]:  about 5 1019 fissions 
 [Soyfer]:  about 5 1019 fissions 
 
A reasonable average of these values may be 1019 fissions. (få inn Sivintsevs artikkel om hva 
some r sannsynlig…)Since each and every fission result in an energy release of about 200 MeV, 
this corresponds to an energy production of about 0.004 MWd or the energy equivalence of about 
80 kg TNT 
 
The contribution of the fission product produced during the power excursion may seem negligible 
as compared to that due to burn-up, which amounts to an energy production of up to 40 000 
MWd. This is correct as regards the fission products with long half-lives. But if the accident 
occurs in connection with re/defueling the release of fission products with short half-lives will be 
dominated by those produced during the excursion, since re/defueling will usually take place 
about one year or more after the shut-down of the reactor. At this time the short-lived fission 
products produced during ordinary operation have decayed. Further, if the accident occurs in a 
core with fresh fuel the only fission products in the core are those produced during the power 
excursion.  
 
 
4.1.2 Production of short-lived fission products during the excursion 
Criticality accidents are not likely to occur during reactor operation as mentioned earlier, since 
the control system will shut the reactor down once it becomes sufficiently supercritical. They are 
much more likely during re/defueling or repair work at shipyards. This type of work will usually 
be performed some time after close-down of the reactor, e.g. one year. At this time the short-lived 
fission products have decayed. However, immediately after the power excursion of a criticality 
accident the short-lived fission products produced by the excursion will be of importance. This is 
in particular true for noble gases such as krypton and xenon, which have high release fractions 
(cf. section 4.2.6), and which can easily be carried away from the place of accident by the wind. 
 
Here the case is considered where a short-lived fission product (the first), produced in the fission 
process, decays into another fission product (the second), also produced in the fission process. If 
there are any precursors nuclei to the first fission product they are assumed to decay into the first 
fission product immediately. Under this assumption the activity of the first fission product is 
 
t
fe eNN
1
1111
λγλλ −=  
 
Here N1 is the number of the first fission product, λ1 its decay constant, γ1 the yield per fission of 
the first fission product and its precursors (the so-called cumulative fractional yield) and Nfe the 
number of fissions produced during the excursion. The activity of the second fission product 
consists of nuclei produced either directly by fission or by the decay of the first fission product. 
The expression of the former is quite similar to that of the first nuclei: 
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Here λ2 is the decay constant of the second fission product and γ2 its fractional yield. The number 
of the second nuclei produced by decay of the first is given by the equation 
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The solution of this differential equation is 
 [ ]ttfeb eeNN 211
12
1
2
λλγλλ
λ −− −−=  
 
so that the total activity of the second fission product becomes 
 
( ) [ ]ttfetfeba eeNeNNNN 212 1
12
21
2222222
λλλ γλλ
λλγλλλ −−− −−+=+=  
 
By use of these formulas the activity of a number of noble gas fission products and their daughter 
nuclei, produced during the excursion, was calculated and compared with results presented by 
[Pologikh3].  The γ-values used in the calculations were those of [Meek] and the half-lives those 
of  [Lederer]. The cumulative fractional yield was used for γ1. Nf was assumed to be equal to 1019 
fissions (cf. 4.2.1) and the activity was calculated 10, 100 and 600 seconds after the excursion. 
The results of the calculations are presented in Table 4.2. 
 
 
Table 4.1 Activity of Short-lived Fission Products (in PBq) after a criticality excursion 
 
Isotopes Present Pologikh Present Pologikh Present Pologikh 
 10s 100s 600s 
89Kr+89Rb 1.66 1.25 1.30 0.985 0.435 0.318 
91Kr+91Rb 15.40 13.10 2.13 1.510 0.0054 0.003 
137Xe  1.80 0.91 1.37 0.70 0.302 0.165 
138Xe+138Cs 0.52 0.23 0.500 0.215 0.400 0.171 
139Xe+139Cs 7.69 5.82 2.08 1.600 0.340 0.253 
140Xe+139Cs 14.78 12.20 2.636 1.720 0.012 0.007 
 
The values obtained in the present calculations (“Present” in Table 4.2) differ from those of 
[Pologikh3] (“Pologikh” in Table 4.2) by up to a factor of two, but the variation with time is quite 
similar. The difference is probably due to different yield values and to differences in the 
assumptions made. 
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4.1.3 Production of long-lived fission products during the excursion 
The activity of long-lived fission products produced during the excursion may be calculated by 
use of the formula 
 
ffp NA γλ=  
 
Here again Nf is assumed to be 1019 fissions, λ is the decay constant of the fission product 
considered and γ is the cumulative fractional yield. This formula assumes that the long-lived 
fission products are formed directly by fission which is nor quite correct. The activity values 
obtained are given in Table 4.3. 
 
 
Table 4.2 Activity of Long-lived Fission Products Produced during the Excursion 
 
90Sr 0.45  GBq 
106Ru 0.85  GBq 
137Cs 0.46  GBq 
144Ce 15.42  GBq 
147Pm 1.91  GBq 
 
It is seen that these activities are six orders of magnitude lower than the corresponding activities 
of the long-lived fission products of Table 4.1. However, if the fuel in the reactor, which suffers a 
criticality accident, contains fresh fuel the long-lived fission products are those of Table 4.3. 
 
 
4.1.4 Release fractions 
An important factor in the release of activity from a criticality accidents is the fraction of the 
fission products which is released to the environment during the accident. This fraction varies 
with the chemical nature of the individual fission products. [Pologikh2] gives values for the 
release fractions in case of a criticality accident. They are listed in Table 4.5. 
 
 
Table 4.3 Russian Release Fractions for Submarine Criticality Accidents 
 
Kr, Xe:  0.1 
I, Br, Ru, Te, Cs: 0.01 
All other elements (including transuranium elements): 0.002 
 
It is of interest to compare these release fractions with those of the Chernobyl criticality accident, 
taking into account the differences in the two types of criticality accidents. For the Chernobyl 
accident [NEA] gives the following (rounded off) values: 
 
 
Table 4.4 NEA Release Fractions for the Chernobyl Accident 
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Xe: 1 
I:  0.6 
Cs: 0.3 
Te:  0.4 
Sr, Ba:  0.05 
Zr, Mo, Ru, Ce:  0.04 
 
These figures can not directly be compared with figures for a criticality accident with a submarine 
reactor (PWR). In the case of the Chernobyl reactor the melted fuel caused the graphite moderator 
to burn and this caused the activity emission of continue for 10 days until all graphite was burned. 
In a PWR the release will stop when the fuel solidifies, i.e. after a period of the order of one hour. 
According to [NEA] 24% of the total release occurred on the first day. A significant part of this 
release is likely to have have occurred during the first hour, e.g. 50%, after which the release 
became more or less constant. Thus, the Chernobyl release figures should be reduced by a factor 
of about 10 to correspond to a PWR accident. If this is done, it yields the following comparison 
between the figures of [Pologikh2] and [NEA]: 
 
 
Table 4.5 Comparison of Russian and Corrected NEA Release Fractions 
 
 Pologikh2  ”NEA” 
Xe, Kr:  0.1 0.1 
I, Br, Ru, Te, Cs:  0.01 0.03-0.06 
All other elements: 0.002 0.004-0.005 
 
With the reduction of a factor of 10 and taking into account the uncertainty involved in the 
deduction of the factor 10, the agreement between [Pologikh2] and [NEA] seems to be quite 
reasonable. 
 
 
4.1.5 Release heights 
In the excursion much of the activity together with the hot steam is lifted up into the atmosphere 
from where it is dispersed by the wind and by diffusion. In dispersion models the effective release 
height is introduced and the following values for this height are reported in the literature: 
 
 
       Table 4.6 Effective Release Height 
  
[Lystsov] 50-100 m 
[Pologikh2]  30 m 
[Smetsers]  75 m 
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4.2 Loss-of- Cooling Accidents 
Loss-of-cooling accidents (LOCA) usually occurs when the reactor is running at power and the 
cooling is reduced or totally stopped due to a leakage (caused by e.g. corrosion or maloperation of 
valves) in the primary system or the stoppage of the main circulation pumps. Stoppage of the 
circulation pumps in the secondary circuit can also cause a LOCA. In the case of a leakage, the 
cooling water will be drained from the primary circuit through the leak, the fuel will no longer be 
cooled sufficiently, the fuel temperature will increase and the fuel may ultimately melt and 
release fission products into the primary circuit and the reactor compartment. In the case of pump 
failure the coolant pressure will increase, the safety valves will be activated and a steam/water 
mixture will flow out into the reactor compartment, gradually draining the reactor tank and 
reducing the cooling of the fuel, which may ultimately melt. 
 
Usually the chain reaction will be stopped as soon as the leakage starts or the pumps stop. 
However, even when the chain reaction stops the heat production in the core will continue, 
though at a reduced level, due to the decay heat from the decay of the fission products. For a 
reactor which has been running at power for some time the power level will immediately after 
shut-down drop to 6-7% of the level before shut-down. After one hour it will be around 1% and 
after one day around 0.5% of the power level before shut-down. The decay heat DH may be 
obtained from the following formula: 
 
( )( )2.02.00667.0 −− +−= ττ TPDH  
 
Here T is the time operation prior to the accident (in seconds), τ is the time after the accident has 
occurred (in seconds) and P the reactor power level prior to the accident (in MW). Using these 
unite DH is obtained in MW. The validity of the formula is limited to τ= 1 day. For longer 
periods of time other, but similar relations should be used. 
 
If this decay heat is not removed, the fuel will overheat and fission products will be released. To 
avoid damage to the fuel in case of a leakage of the primary system reactors are usually provided 
with an emergency core cooling system (ECCS), which will ensure that the core is all the time 
covered with water and thereby sufficiently cooled. However, it seems as if the first generation of 
Russian nuclear vessels were not provided with such a system or at least not with a sufficiently 
effective system so that a number of LOCAs occurred in Russian vessels. 
 
LOCAs may also occur shortly after reactor shut-down when the decay heat is still significant. 
Such an accident happened at the icebreaker Lenin, when the reactor had been shut down for 
refuelling and an operator by mistake opened a valve and drained part of the reactor core. Even if 
there is no leakage the stopping of the coolant flow immediately after shut-down may lead to fuel 
damage. However, after some hours natural circulation in the primary system will usually provide 
the necessary cooling of the reduced power production. Two years after shut-down the reactor 
may be drained without any damage to the fuel.  
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When a LOCA occurs and the fuel is damage, radioactive gases and particles will be released into 
the reactor compartment by the leaking steam-water mixture, and the pressure in the reactor 
compartment will increase. This could lead to the dispersion of the radioactive materials. What 
happens depends on the design and integrity of the submarine, but there are two features that will 
counteract the dispersal. Firstly, large areas of the submarine surface are in excellent thermal 
contact with surrounding sea, and this feature will act as a pressure suppression system, because 
the steam will condense on the inner side of the pressure hull together with most of the fission 
products. Secondly, the submarine is divided up into a number of compartments with bulkheads 
between the compartments. These bulkheads can be closed and should prevent the spread of the 
radioactive materials. However, experience show that it is difficult to keep the bulkheads closed 
during an emergency. But the pressure hull of the submarine will act as an efficient containment 
since it has to be tight and has in practice only one opening, the hatch to the sail or conning tower, 
which is usually closed. This means that even if the contamination spreads to most of the 
submarine, very little will get out of the submarine. That this is so was observed in the case of the 
Echo-II class submarine, which suffered a LOCA 110 km north west of Sørøya of northern 
Norway. Water samples taken by the Norwegian authorities close to the submarine indicated very 
little if any contamination of the sea. 
 
It seems therefore reasonable to conclude that due to the pressure suppression property and 
containment efficiency of the pressure hull of the nuclear submarines, very little activity will in 
the case of a LOCA escape from the submarine and that it will only result in very local 
contamination. 
 
 
4.3 Sunken Nuclear Submarines 
A number of nuclear submarine accidents has happened which resulted in the sinking of the 
vessel. Two US submarines and three Russian submarines rest today at the bottom of the sea. In 
1963 the US Thresher sank off the coast of Cape Cod at a depth of 2600 m - presumably due to 
in-leakage of water - during sea trials after it had undergone an overhaul at a shipyard. It was 
crushed by water pressure. In 1968 the US Scorpion sank at a depth of 3600 m – presumably 
killed by one of its own homing torpedoes – when crossing the Atlantic Ocean. In 1970 a Russian 
November class submarine sank - due to a fire - at a depth of 4700 m in the British Channel. In 
1986 a Russian Yankee class submarine sank in the Atlantic Ocean – due to an explosion – at a 
depth of 5-6 km. In 1989 a Russian Mike class submarine sank in the Norwegian Sea - due to a 
fire – at a depth of 1680 m. 
 
Further from the sixties to the beginning of the eighties Russian dumped six submarine reactor 
compartments, four of them with fuel in one or both of the reactors. They were dumped in the 
Kara Sea off the coast of Novaya Zemlya. The four submarines with fuel in one or both reactors 
are believed to be a Hotel, a November, a Yankee and a Project 645 class submarine, and they 
had all suffered accidents whereby the fuel had been damaged. Before the dumping the reactors 
were in general covered chemical compounds to delay release of fission products to the sea. 
 
Measurements of the release of radioactive isotopes to the sea have been made both for the US 
and the Russian sunken submarines and the dumped reactor compartments. Very small 
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concentrations of fission products and cobalt-60 have been detected, so the release has been slow 
and the released radioisotopes are transported away from the submarines by the sea currents of 
the sea, hereby decreasing the activity concentration, but increasing the volume of contaminated 
seawater. 
 
However, as the corrosion of the reactor system and the fuel caused by the seawater proceeds, 
more radioisotopes will be released. On the other hand the materials used in the reactors are in 
general rather corrosion resistant, so the release will be slow, and the content of radioactive 
material will also gradually decrease due to the radioactive decay.  
 
The importance of the release depends also on where it happens. If it occurs in an area of the sea 
important for fishing, its effect may well be significant, not so much because of actual 
contamination of the fish, but because fear of contamination may make it difficult to sell fish 
from this area.  
 
If a submarine sinks close to areas of significant human activity, e.g. cities or summer resorts, the 
psychological effect may also be significant. However, here the depth will in general be shallow 
and the salvage of the submarine fairly simple. In two cases the submarines sank at shallow depth 
and were later recovered. One case involved a Russian Charlie-1 class submarine that sank in 
1983 at a depth of 35 m due to an operator error near Kamchatka. The other involved an Oscar 
class submarine (Kursk) that sank in 2000 at a depth of 108 m due to a torpedo explosion in the 
Barent Sea. In both cases the submarines were recovered. 
 
From the considerations given above it may be concluded that the sinking of a nuclear submarine 
will result in source terms that are very small, if not negligible. However, if the sinking occurs 
near areas of human activity the psychological effect may nevertheless be quite significant. 
 
The Komsomolets submarine sank in 1989 in the Norwegian Sea, south of Bear Island. Minor 
releases of radioactivity from the reactor compartment have been detected, but large scale 
releases are thought to be unlikely because the engineered barriers will prevent corrosion of 
reactor fuel for some time. The latest accident involving a Russian submarine, the Kursk in 
August 2000, with subsequent rescue operations, raised considerable concern along the coastline 
about possible consequences, and represented a significant challenge for the Norwegian nuclear 
emergency preparedness organisation from the day the accident happened until the larger part of 
the submarine had been brought in dock in Roslyakovo. The Norwegian Radiation Protection 
Authority completed an environmental risk assessment for four scenarios combining two 
calculations of inventory and two release scenarios. 
 
The calculations of the inventory of Kursk were based of the description of the Russian cargo 
ship Sevmorput with some adjustments of the technical input data, as have been the basis for the 
inventory calculations in this report. The hypothetical release rate of radionuclides depends 
heavily on the release conditions. These conditions may range from instantaneous release as a 
result of explosions of torpedoes or cruise missiles left in the submarine, to the slow long-term 
corrosion of the fuel material. The latter may occur when seawater has penetrated the fuel 
cladding. If the cladding is zirconium, penetration may take several hundred years or more.  
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However, if conditions for galvanic corrosion are present, the cladding may perhaps be corroded 
through in less than a year. 
  
The following two scenarios for releases of radionuclides have been selected for the wide range 
of possibilities in the present situation:  
 
• Scenario 1, corresponding to an abnormal event one year after the accident, i. e. during 
the salvage operation, 100% of the inventory in both reactors is released instantaneously.  
 
• Scenario 2, corresponding to the assumption that all barriers, for all practical purposes, 
have been removed after 100 years, and 100% of the inventory in both reactors are 
released at this point.  
 
With respect to fuel burn-up, two different versions of the operational history, resulting in a burn-
up on 12000 respectively 24000 MWd, have been considered with each scenario. Both versions 
are based on the submarine being operative for an average of 50 days per year, for each year since 
commissioning at the end of 1994. However, scenario 2 includes extensive operation of the 
reactors for production of electrical power when in port as reported in several sources during 
recent years. It should be noted that an estimated release of 100% of the inventory is a very 
conservative approach chose to demonstrate the consequences of a simple scenario, even if not 
realistic, to the concerned public, new approaches are being established as part of the follow-up 
activities as described in the introduction to this report.  
 
Estimations of the radiological consequences in the marine environment after potential releases of 
radionuclides from the Kursk submarine were performed on this basis. The elements for the 
modelling work are the two given scenarios, and a box model, which estimates radionuclide 
transport over large distances (> 1000 km) and over long time-scales (up to centuries or 
millennia). The present model is based on the box modelling approach, which includes terms that 
describe the dispersion of radionuclides into oceanic space with time. The present model is a 
revised version of the box model covering the European coastal waters, Arctic and the North 
Atlantic Oceans. 
 
The model calculation of transport, transfer to fish and collective doses to humans following the 
given scenarios is performed for a range of different radionuclides, which are present in the 
reactors. However, most attention is focused on 137Cs release. This is due to the fact that 137Cs has 
a relatively long physical half life (30 years), is readily dissolved in the water phase and 
accumulates readily in edible parts of fish and shellfish. Dispersion of 137Cs in the oceanic surface 
water, corresponding to the worst case of the potential accidental releases with immediate release 
of spent fuel with high burn-up, show that 0.5 years after a hypothetical accidental release of 
100% of the inventory, the average water concentration in the Barents Sea will be in the range 
160 – 210 Bq/m3 for areas in close vicinity to the submarine. 137Cs activities will decrease rapidly, 
and after 10 years it is estimated that the average water concentration in the Barents Sea will be in 
the range 0.1 – 2.8 Bq/m3.  
 
Regarding the dynamics for the 137Cs concentration in fish for the Barents Sea region 
(corresponding to the same scenario), the calculations indicate that during the first years of 
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potential dispersion, the 137Cs activity concentration in fish varies widely depending on the habitat 
of fish. During the early stages of the dispersion, the Barents Sea contains regions with relatively 
high contamination and regions that are not affected by the release of radionuclides. The model 
calculation of transfer to fish is subject to large uncertainties, and other more hypothetical transfer 
pathways (e.g. ingestion of particles) have not been considered. Calculations show a maximum 
activity concentration of 137Cs in fish, during the first year following a hypothetical leakage from 
the Kursk, in the range 0-100 Bq/kg. For comparison, the intervention level for concentrations of 
137Cs in basic foodstuffs (as recommended by EC and adopted by several countries, e.g. Norway) 
is defined as 600 Bq/kg.  
 
The calculations of the collective dose to man correspond to releases of all radionuclides from 
both reactors according to the aforementioned scenarios. The collective dose to man is dominated 
by the contribution from 137Cs for Scenario 1. The calculations showed that a collective dose of 
61 manSv was attributable to the intake of 137Cs from the Barents Sea alone for the “worst case 
scenario”, while the total collective dose from all radionuclides from the whole marine area was 
estimated to be 97 manSv. In this case, contributions from 137Cs and 239Pu correspond to a total 
dose of 69 manSv and 5.5 manSv, respectively. For comparison, collective doses from other 
radionuclides for the “worst case” scenario are estimated to be 6.5, 4.3, 2.2, 0.37 and 0,27 manSv 
for 90Sr, 134Cs, 241Am, 147Pm and 106Ru, respectively. Considering scenario 2, with corrosion 
leading to release after 100 years, the total collective dose was estimated to be 8.4 manSv for an 
operational period of 12000 MWd. The results from this work suggests that the radionuclide 
inventory is one important factor that needs to be adjusted in future impact assessments.  
Furthermore, approximately 80% of the collective dose from the Barents Sea is attributable to 
137Cs exposure. 239Pu does not contribute significantly to the collective dose for Scenario 1. For 
Scenario 2 however, the contribution of 239Pu to the total collective dose is comparable to that of 
137Cs. This is mainly due to the short radioactive half-life of 137Cs.  
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5 Conclusions 
This report has considered the elements for establishing revised source terms for Russian marine 
vessels. While earlier assessments have been troubled with lack of relevant data, this work has 
taken forward specific information on the relevance of the different accident scenarios and on 
revising the inventory calculations as the basis for further considerations on source term 
composition. 
 
It is hardly surprising that the most severe nuclear accident type is criticality accidents during 
re/defueling since in this case the reactor vessel is open to the environment and there is very little 
to prevent the release of activity contained in the fuel. The loss-of-cooling accident may have 
serious consequences to the submarine crew since the whole submarine may be contaminated, but 
it will result in little activity release to the environment due to the condensation of the active 
steam on the hull and the limited openings in the submarine. The sinking accidents will leave a 
significant amount of activity at the bottom of the sea, but its release to the environment will be 
very slow and therefore result in very small activity concentrations in the surrounding water. 
 
5.1 Recommendations for further study 
The present study has, due to the wide initial scope, been concentrating on some of the elements 
of the source term for Russian marine reactors. However, increased focus has to be put on 
applying these results for full-scope impact assessments, in particular for vulnerable areas for 
example in the Arctic areas where most of the Russian marine reactors actually is operating. In 
addition, while considerable effort has been devoted to the source term for decommissioned 
reactors, additional emphasis has to be put on vessels in operation and the associated release 
mechanisms and source terms. Earlier studies have concentrated on either the releases from 
sunken submarines to the marine environment ([IASAP], [Eriksen]) or releases from 
decommissioned, non-defuelled submarines to sea and air. However, considerations of 
submarines in operation, such as for example Kursk, might give additional insight when taking 
the relevant information on the vessels themselves – and related constructions such as the vessels 
now being decommissioned – into account. One relevant issue is the amount of short-lived 
radionuclides present due to the possible continued operation of the reactors in well-defined areas 
such as fjords and bays fenced off by natural means, at least close to the naval bases in Russia, 
possibly also in neighbouring areas.. 
 
In addition, spent fuel accidents – which has been briefly considered earlier - may well give rise 
to important contamination of areas of the naval bases, and this question may be analysed now 
when information on fuel and storage conditions are more readily available. The main concern is 
a criticality accident with spent fuel, in particular with unknown burn-ups and fuel geometries. 
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ANNEX I. RUSSIAN NUCLEAR SHIP ACCIDENTS 
 
Water cooled and water moderated submarine reactors  - first generation 
Date Project. 
nr./ name 
Class Place Type of 
accident 
Cause of 
accident 
Release of 
radioactivity
Casualties/ 
consequences
Source Entry 
nr. 
19620000 K-003 November   Leakage in the 
reactor systems 
Technical 
malfunction
Yes Reactor out of 
operation from 
1962 to 
november 1965
Apalkov 1996, s. 
62 
2 
19670908 K-003 November Norwegian Sea Fire     39 fatal Ølgaard, NKS-
project Apalkov 
1996, s. 62 
8 
19750200 K-003 November   Fire     Fire in 
compartment 
7, 2 fatal 
Apalkov 1996, s. 
62 
41 
19810108 K-003 November   Fire     Cables replaced 
during repair 
Apalkov 1996, s. 
62 
42 
19650000 K-005 November   Leakage in the 
reactor systems 
Technical 
malfunction
Yes The reactor 
compartment 
were cut out 
and replaced 
Apalkov 1996, s. 
65 
43 
19601013 K-008 November Barents Sea Leak in steam 
generator 
Technical 
malfunction
Yes Exposure to 
radioactivity 
Ølgaard, NKS-
project 
1 
19700411 K-008 November Bay of Biscayan Fire/ sinking     52 fatal Ølgaard, NKS-
project, Apalkov 
1996, s. 68 
11 
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19650212 K-011 November Zwesdochka Criticality 
during refueling
Human 
error 
Yes 7 fatal Ølgaard, NKS-
project, Apalkov 
1996, s. 70 
5 
19620000 K-014 November   Damage of 
emergency 
shielding of one 
reactor. 
    Reactor 
compartment 
was cut out 
and replaced. 
Apalkov 1996, s. 
71 
44 
19880212 K-014 November   Fire     1 fatal. Apalkov 1996, s. 
71 
45 
19690321 K-042 November   Turbine leakage       Apalkov 1996, s. 
73 
46 
19620000 K-052 November   Leakage in 
reactor systems 
  Yes, also the 
crew, 
unknown to 
which extent 
Repair of 
reactor rest of 
1962, and again 
in 1965 and 
1967. 
Apalkov 1996, s. 
77 
49 
19690618 K-052 November   Flooding of salt 
water to parts 
of the reactor 
compartment 
      Apalkov 1996, s. 
77 
47 
19770715 K-052 November   Leakage in 
reactor systems 
    Salted water 
penetrated to 
the second 
circuit, repaired 
of the crew at 
sea. 
Apalkov 1996, s. 
77 
48 
19770116 K-115 November   Fire     1 fatal.  Apalkov 1996, s. 
78 
50 
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19650203 K-159 November   Leakage in 
reactor systems 
      Apalkov 1996, s. 
84 
51 
20030830 K-159 November   Sinking while 
being towed 
    9 fatal Ølgaard, NKS-
project 
40 
19860522 K-016 Hotel   Flooding     The electrical 
equipment of 
the 
compartment 
were damaged 
Apalkov 1996, s. 
124 
55 
19610703 K-019 Hotel   LOCA     8 fatal Ølgaard, NKS-
project, Apalkov 
1996, s. 119 
3 
19691115 K-019 Hotel   Collision     Damage in the 
back end of the 
front part of 
the Russian 
submarine. 
Apalkov 1996, s. 
119 
54 
19720224 K-019 Hotel North-Atlantic Fire     30 fatal Ølgaard, NKS-
project, Apalkov 
1996, s. 119 
13 
19781115 K-019 Hotel   Fire       Apalkov 1996, s. 
119 
52 
19820817 K-019 Hotel   Fire     3 people 
injured 
Apalkov 1996, s. 
119 
53 
19630411 K-033 Hotel   Fire       Apalkov 1996, s. 
126 
56 
19770000 K-055 Hotel   Fire       Apalkov 1996, s. 
130 
58 
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19780000 K-055 Hotel   Fire       Apalkov 1996, s. 
130 
59 
19860000 K-055 Hotel   Leakage in 
reactor systems 
    Submarine 
taken 
permanently 
out of service 
Apalkov 1996, s. 
130 
57 
19751125 K-149 Hotel   Leakage in 
reactor systems 
      Apalkov 1996, s. 
138 
60 
19771221 K-149 Hotel   Fire     Lost 
propulsion 
Apalkov 1996, s. 
138 
62 
19780303 K-149 Hotel   Fire     1 injured Apalkov 1996, s. 
138 
63 
19751200 K-178 Hotel   Flooding     Left reactor 
became 
inoperationable
Apalkov 1996, s. 
139 
64 
19760700 K-178 Hotel   Leakage in 
reactor systems 
    Compensators 
replaced  
Apalkov 1996, s. 
139 
65 
19880125 K-178 Hotel   Fire in the 
turbine 
compartment 
where personal 
respiratories/ 
breathing 
systems were 
stored. 
    1 fatal. One 
pipeline lost its 
strength 
properties.  
Apalkov 1996, s. 
139 
66 
19770000 K-? Echo-II Indian Ocean Fire       Ølgaard, NKS-
project 
18 
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19860113 K-? Echo-II 450 km north 
west of 
Okinawa in 
East China Sea 
Propulsion 
failure 
      Ølgaard, NKS-
project 
32 
19780808 K-001 Echo-II Near Rockall 
225 km north 
west of 
Scotland 
Propulsion 
system failure 
      Ølgaard, NKS-
project, Apalkov 
1996, s. 176 
19 
19790601 K-010 Echo-II   Explosion     One officer 
cabin was 
destroyed 
Apalkov 1996, s. 
179 
86 
19830121 K-010 Echo-II   Collision     Submarine 
taken out of 
service 
Apalkov 1996, s. 
176 
61 
19770828 K-022 Echo-II   Collision     Water 
penetration 
into the 
pressure hull 
Apalkov 1996, s. 
180 
84 
19750000 K-023 Echo-II   Reactor 
accident 
    Main 
propulsion unit 
out of 
operation 
Apalkov 1996, s. 
184 
79 
19770127 K-023 Echo-II   Leakage in 
reactor systems 
    Taken out of 
service, 
reconstruction. 
Apalkov 1996, s. 
184 
82 
19751207 K-035 Echo-II   Explosion     2 injured Apalkov 1996, s. 
188 
80 
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19760924 K-047 Echo-II Barents Sea Fire in 
compartment 8 
    8 fatal Ølgaard, NKS-
project, Apalkov 
1996, s. 189 
17 
19840924 K-047 Echo-II   Leakage in 
reactor systems 
    Submarine 
taken of 
operation 
Apalkov 1996, s. 
189 
92 
19730614 K-056 Echo-II Pacific Ocean 
near Nahodka 
Collision   No 27 fatal, large 
holes in 
compartment 
II of 
submarine. 
Ølgaard, NKS-
project, Apalkov 
1996, s. 191 
15 
19770714 K-056 Echo-II   Reactor 
accident 
  ???   Apalkov 1996, s. 
191 
83 
19770714 K-056 Echo-II   Leakage in 
reactor systems 
    The submarine 
was out of 
operation 
Apalkov 1996, s. 
191 
96 
19750125 K-057 Echo-II     Human 
error 
  2 fatal  Apalkov 1996, s. 
192 
97 
19840520 K-057 Echo-II   Fire       Apalkov 1996, s. 
192 
91 
19801221 K-057? Echo-II 140 or 460 km 
east of 
Okinawa 
Fire     9 fatal, 3 
injured 
Ølgaard, NKS-
project, Apalkov 
1996, s. 192 
23 
19651111 K-074 Echo-II   Run-away of 
steam turbine 
      Ølgaard, NKS-
project 
6 
19790000 K-090 Echo-II   Leakage in 
reactor systems 
    Reactor out of 
operation twice 
during 6 days. 
Apalkov 1996, s. 
194 
85 
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19830811 K-094 Echo-II   Leakage in 
reactor systems 
      Apalkov 1996, s. 
195 
88 
19840321 K-094 Echo-II   Leakage in 
reactor systems 
    The submarine 
was taken out 
of service. 
Apalkov 1996, s. 
195 
89 
19670908 K-116 Echo-II   Failure of 
cooling system 
    Reactor taken 
out of 
operation for 
some time (?) 
Apalkov 1996, s. 
199 
72 
19760418 K-116 Echo-II gorlje 
avachinska 
gubje 
Collision     Bulk in the 
ballast tank 
(0,5x1 m). 
Apalkov 1996, s. 
198 
98 
19790702 K-116 Echo-II Pavlovskbukten LOCA Human 
error 
yes   Ølgaard, NKS-
project, Apalkov 
1996, s. 198 
22 
19720619 K-131 Echo-II   Collision     Damage of 
breakwater and 
failure of 
leakproofness 
of the front 
part. 
Apalkov 1996, s. 
202 
76 
19820928 K-131 Echo-II   Explosion     2 fatal, 4 
injured 
Apalkov 1996, s. 
202 
77 
19840618 K-131 Echo-II   Fire in 
compartment 7 
      Apalkov 1996, s. 
202 
78 
19840618 K-131 Echo-II Arctic Sea Fire     13 or 14 fatal Ølgaard, NKS-
project, Apalkov 
1996, s. 202 
29 
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19760311 K-144 Echo-II   Flooding       Apalkov 1996, s. 
210 
81 
19690000 K-166 Echo-II   Leakage in 
reactor systems 
    Reactor core 
had to be 
replaced 
Apalkov 1996, s. 
204 
74 
19701210 K-166 Echo-II   Oil leakage     Weapons and 
equipment 
failure 
Apalkov 1996, s. 
204 
75 
19680300 K-172 Echo-II   Contamination      126 people got 
poisoned with 
quicksilvergas.  
Apalkov 1996, s. 
206 
99 
19750000 K-172 Echo-II   Leakage in 
reactor systems 
      Apalkov 1996, s. 
206 
100 
19780000 K-172 Echo-II   Generator 
failure 
      Apalkov 1996, s. 
206 
101 
19680000 K-175 Echo-II   Leakage in 
reactor systems 
      Apalkov 1996, s. 
208 
73 
19850929 K-175 Echo-II   Reactor 
accident  
Human 
error 
Yes Due to wrong 
actions of the 
crew.  
Apalkov 1996, s. 
208 
94 
19861100 K-175 Echo-II   Reactor 
accident  
  Yes   Apalkov 1996, s. 
208 
102 
19810320 K-184 Echo-II   Collision       Apalkov 1996, s. 
209 
87 
19840326 K-184 Echo-II   Reactor 
accident 
      Apalkov 1996, s. 
209 
90 
19850607 K-184 Echo-II   Reactor 
accident 
      Apalkov 1996, s. 
209 
93 
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19860300 K-184 Echo-II   Reactor 
accident 
    Repair and 
limited 
operation 
regime was 
decided. 
Apalkov 1996, s. 
209 
95 
19890615 K-192 Echo-II 350 km south 
of Bear Island, 
110 km north 
west of Sørøya  
LOCA of the 
left reactor 
  Yes Higher doses 
to personnel, 
submarine was 
taken out of 
operation. 
Ølgaard, NKS-
project, Apalkov 
1996, s. 207 
35 
19850810 K-431 Echo-II Chazhma Bay 
60 km south 
south east of 
Vladivostok 
Criticality Refueling   10 fatal 
immidiately 
Ølgaard, NKS-
project, Apalkov 
1996, s. 186 
30 
19791216 K-045 Echo-I   Leakage in 
reactor systems 
      Apalkov 1996, s. 
159 
67 
19860000 K-059/K-
259 
Echo-I   Leakage in 
reactor systems 
      Apalkov 1996, s. 
160 
69 
19660506 K-066 Echo-I   Fire       Apalkov 1996, s. 
165 
71 
19810000 K-066 Echo-I   Leakage in 
reactor systems 
    Submarine 
taken out of 
operation 
Apalkov 1996, s. 
165 
70 
19800820 K-122 Echo-I   Fire       Apalkov 1996, s. 
167 
68 
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19680823 K-140 Yankee Severodvinsk Criticality       Ølgaard, NKS-
project 
10 
19861003 K-219 Yankee 800 km east of 
Bermuda 
Explosion and 
sinking 
    4 fatal Ølgaard, NKS-
project 
33 
19780902 K-451 Yankee (Pacific Fleet) Fire       Ølgaard, NKS-
project 
20 
19910927 K-? Typhoon White Sea Misssile failure       Ølgaard, NKS-
project 
38 
19800030 K-222 Papa Severodvinsk Criticality Human 
error 
    Ølgaard, NKS-
project 
24 
20000812 K-141 Oscar-II Barents Sea Explosion     118 fatal Ølgaard, NKS-
project 
39 
19890407 K-278 Mike 180-190 km 
south west of 
Bear Island in 
the Norwegian 
Sea. 
Fire and sinking     42 fatal Ølgaard, NKS-
project 
34 
19800000 K-? Delta-III   Reactor 
accident 
    2 fatal Ølgaard, NKS-
project 
25 
19781228 K-171 Delta-I (Pacific Fleet) Reactor 
accident 
    3 fatal Ølgaard, NKS-
project 
21 
19830624 K-429 Charlie-II Krasheninnikov 
Bay at the 
Kamchatka 
peninsula 
  Human 
error 
  2 fatal Ølgaard, NKS-
project 
27 
19851200 K-314? Charlie-I? Near 
Vladivostok 
LOCA       Ølgaard, NKS-
project 
31 
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19700118 K-320/ K-
429 
Charlie-1 Krasnoye 
Somovo 
shipyard in 
Gorki  
Criticality       Ølgaard, NKS-
project 
12 
19760000     Near 
Petropavlovsk, 
Pacific Ocean 
Fire       Ølgaard, NKS-
project 
16 
Liquid metal cooled submarines 
19640000 K-027 LMC - 
Project 
645 
  Coolant 
solidification. 
      Ølgaard, NKS-
project 
4 
19680524 K-027 LMC - 
Project 
645 
  LOCA   Yes   Ølgaard, NKS-
project, Apalkov 
1996, s. 92 
9 
19720000 K-377 LMC - 
Alfa 
Arctic Sea Coolant 
solidification 
      Ølgaard, NKS-
project 
14 
19820408 K-123 LMC - 
Alfa 
Barents Sea Coolant 
solidification 
      Ølgaard, NKS-
project 
26 
19831221 K-123 LMC - 
Alfa 
  Fire     14 fatal Ølgaard, NKS-
project 
28 
19890717 K-? LMC - 
Alfa 
Barent Sea 120 
east of Vardø 
in northern 
Norway 
Instrumentation 
failure 
      Ølgaard, NKS-
project 
36 
Other vessels 
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19660000 Lenin     LOCA       Ølgaard, NKS-
project 
7 
19900100 Surface, 
“Ushakov” 
Cruiser Mediterranean Leak       Ølgaard, NKS-
project 
37 
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ANNEX II. RADIONUCLIDE INVENTORY – RUSSIAN THIRD 
GENERATION SUBMARINE 42000 MWD (94594 MWD/ T HM) – 
SELCETED DECAY PERIODS 
 
 
Burn-up:  42000 MWd/ 94594 MWd/ t HM       
            
Decay (days) 0,1 1 10 100 1 000 
  # Bq # Bq # Bq # Bq # Bq 
H3 2,21E+13 2,21E+13 2,21E+13 2,18E+13 1,90E+13 
C14 0,00E+00 0,00E+00 0,00E+00 0,00E+00 0,00E+00 
CL36 0,00E+00 0,00E+00 0,00E+00 0,00E+00 0,00E+00 
FE55 0,00E+00 0,00E+00 0,00E+00 0,00E+00 0,00E+00 
NI59 0,00E+00 0,00E+00 0,00E+00 0,00E+00 0,00E+00 
CO60 0,00E+00 0,00E+00 0,00E+00 0,00E+00 0,00E+00 
NI63 0,00E+00 0,00E+00 0,00E+00 0,00E+00 0,00E+00 
SE79 3,15E+10 3,15E+10 3,15E+10 3,15E+10 3,15E+10 
KR85 4,12E+14 4,11E+14 4,11E+14 4,04E+14 3,45E+14 
SR89 3,04E+16 3,00E+16 2,65E+16 7,73E+15 3,37E+10 
Y90 4,15E+15 4,15E+15 4,15E+15 4,13E+15 3,89E+15 
SR90 4,15E+15 4,15E+15 4,15E+15 4,13E+15 3,88E+15 
Y91 3,41E+16 3,37E+16 3,03E+16 1,04E+16 2,45E+11 
NB93M 1,18E+06 1,18E+07 1,18E+08 1,18E+09 1,12E+10 
ZR93 1,01E+11 1,01E+11 1,01E+11 1,01E+11 1,01E+11 
ZR95 3,63E+16 3,60E+16 3,26E+16 1,23E+16 7,22E+11 
NB95 1,59E+16 1,63E+16 1,92E+16 1,83E+16 1,59E+12 
NB95M 4,03E+14 4,03E+14 3,80E+14 1,45E+14 8,49E+09 
ZR97 8,24E+16 3,40E+16 4,83E+12 1,71E-26 0,00E+00 
NB97 8,36E+16 3,47E+16 4,93E+12 0,00E+00 0,00E+00 
NB97M 7,82E+16 3,22E+16 4,58E+12 0,00E+00 0,00E+00 
MO99 7,86E+16 6,26E+16 6,46E+15 8,90E+05 0,00E+00 
TC99 6,88E+11 6,89E+11 6,91E+11 6,91E+11 6,91E+11 
TC99M 1,69E+16 5,57E+16 6,26E+15 8,62E+05 0,00E+00 
RU103 2,47E+16 2,43E+16 2,07E+16 4,23E+15 5,32E+08 
RH103M 2,46E+16 2,43E+16 2,07E+16 4,23E+15 5,31E+08 
RU105 1,04E+16 3,58E+14 8,12E-01 0,00E+00 0,00E+00 
RH105 1,48E+16 1,06E+16 1,55E+14 6,34E-05 0,00E+00 
RU106 1,48E+15 1,48E+15 1,46E+15 1,23E+15 2,30E+14 
RH106 1,48E+15 1,48E+15 1,46E+15 1,23E+15 2,30E+14 
AG110M 1,83E+12 1,82E+12 1,78E+12 1,39E+12 1,14E+11 
AG111 3,89E+14 3,58E+14 1,55E+14 3,58E+10 1,53E-26 
SB125 9,26E+13 9,25E+13 9,20E+13 8,64E+13 4,62E+13 
TE125M 2,13E+13 2,13E+13 2,13E+13 2,07E+13 1,13E+13 
SN126 2,28E+10 2,28E+10 2,28E+10 2,28E+10 2,28E+10 
SB126 1,78E+07 1,74E+08 1,37E+09 3,18E+09 3,19E+09 
SB126M 2,27E+10 2,28E+10 2,28E+10 2,28E+10 2,28E+10 
SB127 2,24E+15 1,90E+15 3,76E+14 3,45E+07 0,00E+00 
TE127 2,22E+15 1,86E+15 4,54E+14 6,27E+13 2,05E+11 
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TE127M 1,06E+14 1,08E+14 1,11E+14 6,39E+13 2,09E+11 
TE129 5,67E+14 5,57E+14 4,63E+14 7,23E+13 6,25E+05 
TE129M 8,84E+14 8,68E+14 7,21E+14 1,13E+14 9,73E+05 
I129 8,72E+08 8,72E+08 8,73E+08 8,77E+08 8,78E+08 
I131 3,77E+16 3,49E+16 1,61E+16 6,86E+12 1,38E-21 
TE132 5,59E+16 4,61E+16 6,80E+15 3,29E+07 0,00E+00 
I132 5,67E+16 4,75E+16 7,01E+15 3,39E+07 0,00E+00 
I133 1,88E+17 9,16E+16 6,86E+13 3,76E-18 0,00E+00 
XE133 8,96E+16 9,45E+16 3,43E+16 2,33E+11 0,00E+00 
CS134 8,90E+14 8,89E+14 8,82E+14 8,12E+14 3,54E+14 
I135 8,56E+16 8,77E+15 1,11E+06 0,00E+00 0,00E+00 
XE135 6,47E+16 3,27E+16 4,24E+09 0,00E+00 0,00E+00 
CS135 3,89E+10 3,89E+10 3,89E+10 3,89E+10 3,89E+10 
CS136 7,73E+14 7,37E+14 4,59E+14 4,01E+12 1,04E-08 
CS137 4,29E+15 4,29E+15 4,29E+15 4,26E+15 4,03E+15 
BA137M 4,05E+15 4,05E+15 4,05E+15 4,02E+15 3,80E+15 
BA140 7,57E+16 7,20E+16 4,42E+16 3,32E+14 1,88E-07 
LA140 7,58E+16 7,52E+16 5,07E+16 3,82E+14 2,17E-07 
CE141 5,02E+16 4,92E+16 4,07E+16 5,96E+15 2,75E+07 
CE143 7,39E+16 4,69E+16 5,03E+14 9,94E-06 0,00E+00 
PR143 7,09E+16 7,04E+16 4,77E+16 4,81E+14 5,21E-06 
PR144 1,55E+16 1,55E+16 1,52E+16 1,22E+16 1,36E+15 
PR144M 2,18E+14 2,17E+14 2,12E+14 1,71E+14 1,91E+13 
CE144 1,55E+16 1,55E+16 1,52E+16 1,22E+16 1,36E+15 
ND147 2,80E+16 2,64E+16 1,50E+16 5,11E+13 1,08E-11 
PM147 4,72E+15 4,73E+15 4,84E+15 4,69E+15 2,45E+15 
SM147 3,40E+05 3,40E+05 3,41E+05 3,49E+05 4,04E+05 
ND148 1,30E+04 1,30E+04 1,30E+04 1,30E+04 1,30E+04 
PM148 1,16E+15 1,03E+15 3,35E+14 3,87E+12 1,06E+06 
PM148M 3,91E+14 3,85E+14 3,31E+14 7,30E+13 2,01E+07 
PM149 1,46E+16 1,10E+16 6,57E+14 3,69E+02 0,00E+00 
SM151 3,15E+13 3,16E+13 3,17E+13 3,16E+13 3,10E+13 
PM151 5,40E+15 3,19E+15 1,64E+13 2,08E-10 0,00E+00 
SM153 5,68E+15 4,11E+15 1,62E+14 1,43E+00 0,00E+00 
EU154 5,80E+13 5,80E+13 5,79E+13 5,67E+13 4,65E+13 
EU155 3,66E+13 3,65E+13 3,64E+13 3,51E+13 2,44E+13 
EU156 8,16E+14 7,83E+14 5,19E+14 8,55E+12 1,25E-05 
TB160 7,17E+11 7,10E+11 6,52E+11 2,75E+11 4,92E+07 
TL208 2,86E+06 2,87E+06 2,95E+06 3,84E+06 1,28E+07 
PB210 6,60E-06 4,48E-03 4,48E-01 4,48E+01 4,48E+03 
BI210 6,60E-06 4,48E-03 4,48E-01 4,48E+01 4,48E+03 
PO210 6,60E-06 4,48E-03 4,48E-01 4,48E+01 4,48E+03 
BI214 6,60E-06 4,48E-03 4,48E-01 4,48E+01 4,48E+03 
PB214 6,60E-06 4,48E-03 4,48E-01 4,48E+01 4,48E+03 
PO214 6,60E-06 4,48E-03 4,48E-01 4,48E+01 4,48E+03 
PO218 6,60E-06 4,48E-03 4,48E-01 4,48E+01 4,48E+03 
RN222 6,60E-06 4,48E-03 4,48E-01 4,48E+01 4,48E+03 
RA226 6,60E-06 4,48E-03 4,48E-01 4,48E+01 4,48E+03 
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TH228 7,94E+06 7,97E+06 8,21E+06 1,07E+07 3,56E+07 
TH230 7,56E+02 7,56E+03 7,56E+04 7,56E+05 7,56E+06 
U232 3,51E+07 3,51E+07 3,54E+07 3,86E+07 6,13E+07 
PA233 5,71E+09 5,71E+09 5,70E+09 5,72E+09 5,73E+09 
U233 6,80E+00 6,80E+01 6,79E+02 6,80E+03 6,82E+04 
PA234 8,41E+05 3,54E+06 3,87E+06 3,87E+06 3,87E+06 
PA234M 2,97E+09 2,97E+09 2,97E+09 2,97E+09 2,97E+09 
TH234 3,03E+09 3,02E+09 3,01E+09 2,98E+09 2,97E+09 
U234 3,00E+11 3,00E+11 3,00E+11 3,00E+11 3,00E+11 
U235 1,18E+10 1,18E+10 1,18E+10 1,18E+10 1,18E+10 
U236 2,27E+10 2,27E+10 2,27E+10 2,27E+10 2,27E+10 
PU236 1,38E+09 1,38E+09 1,37E+09 1,30E+09 7,19E+08 
U237 1,29E+16 1,18E+16 4,67E+15 4,62E+11 8,56E+09 
NP237 5,61E+09 5,62E+09 5,68E+09 5,72E+09 5,73E+09 
PU238 1,11E+13 1,11E+13 1,12E+13 1,13E+13 1,13E+13 
NP238 1,49E+15 1,11E+15 5,81E+13 3,96E+08 3,91E+08 
U238 2,97E+09 2,97E+09 2,97E+09 2,97E+09 2,97E+09 
PU239 4,69E+12 4,70E+12 4,72E+12 4,72E+12 4,72E+12 
U239 2,10E+15 5,00E-02 0,00E+00 0,00E+00 0,00E+00 
NP239 1,00E+17 7,68E+16 5,43E+15 3,19E+09 3,19E+09 
NP240 1,15E+13 5,75E+06 0,00E+00 0,00E+00 0,00E+00 
PU240 2,53E+12 2,53E+12 2,53E+12 2,53E+12 2,53E+12 
PU241 4,06E+14 4,06E+14 4,06E+14 4,01E+14 3,56E+14 
AM241 2,37E+12 2,37E+12 2,39E+12 2,55E+12 4,02E+12 
PU242 1,21E+09 1,21E+09 1,21E+09 1,21E+09 1,21E+09 
CM242 7,14E+13 7,20E+13 6,99E+13 4,77E+13 1,11E+12 
AM242M 8,81E+10 8,81E+10 8,81E+10 8,80E+10 8,70E+10 
AM242 4,51E+14 1,77E+14 1,03E+11 8,76E+10 8,66E+10 
PU243 5,56E+13 2,71E+12 2,06E-01 0,00E+00 0,00E+00 
AM243 3,19E+09 3,19E+09 3,19E+09 3,19E+09 3,19E+09 
CM243 4,76E+09 4,76E+09 4,76E+09 4,72E+09 4,45E+09 
AM244 5,17E+12 1,18E+12 4,29E+05 0,00E+00 0,00E+00 
CM244 7,24E+10 7,26E+10 7,26E+10 7,19E+10 6,54E+10 
CM245 2,16E+06 2,16E+06 2,16E+06 2,16E+06 2,16E+06 
CM246 7,05E+04 7,05E+04 7,05E+04 7,05E+04 7,05E+04 
CM248 2,58E-02 2,58E-02 2,58E-02 2,58E-02 2,58E-02 
CF252 7,67E+00 7,66E+00 7,61E+00 7,14E+00 3,74E+00 
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ANNEX III. RADIONUCLIDE INVENTORY – RUSSIAN 
ICEBREAKER - SEVMORPUT (78000 MWD (466000 MWD/ T HM)) 
– SELCETED DECAY PERIODS  
 
 
Burn-up:  78000 MWd (466000 MWd/ t HM)       
            
Decay (days) 0,1 1 10 100 1 000 
  # Bq # Bq # Bq # Bq # Bq 
H3 4,10E+13 4,10E+13 4,10E+13 4,04E+13 3,52E+13 
C14 0,00E+00 0,00E+00 0,00E+00 0,00E+00 0,00E+00 
CL36 0,00E+00 0,00E+00 0,00E+00 0,00E+00 0,00E+00 
FE55 0,00E+00 0,00E+00 0,00E+00 0,00E+00 0,00E+00 
NI59 0,00E+00 0,00E+00 0,00E+00 0,00E+00 0,00E+00 
CO60 0,00E+00 0,00E+00 0,00E+00 0,00E+00 0,00E+00 
NI63 0,00E+00 0,00E+00 0,00E+00 0,00E+00 0,00E+00 
SE79 5,85E+10 5,85E+10 5,85E+10 5,85E+10 5,84E+10 
KR85 1,01E+15 1,01E+15 1,01E+15 9,92E+14 8,46E+14 
SR89 6,62E+16 6,54E+16 5,78E+16 1,68E+16 7,36E+10 
Y90 8,68E+15 8,68E+15 8,68E+15 8,63E+15 8,12E+15 
SR90 8,68E+15 8,68E+15 8,68E+15 8,63E+15 8,12E+15 
Y91 7,98E+16 7,89E+16 7,10E+16 2,44E+16 5,72E+11 
NB93M 2,20E+06 2,20E+07 2,19E+08 2,18E+09 2,07E+10 
ZR93 1,87E+11 1,87E+11 1,87E+11 1,87E+11 1,87E+11 
ZR95 8,83E+16 8,74E+16 7,93E+16 2,99E+16 1,75E+12 
NB95 7,80E+16 7,81E+16 7,90E+16 4,98E+16 3,87E+12 
NB95M 9,81E+14 9,80E+14 9,24E+14 3,52E+14 2,06E+10 
ZR97 7,41E+16 3,05E+16 4,34E+12 1,45E-26 0,00E+00 
NB97 7,52E+16 3,12E+16 4,43E+12 2,26E-26 0,00E+00 
NB97M 7,03E+16 2,90E+16 4,12E+12 0,00E+00 0,00E+00 
MO99 9,42E+16 7,51E+16 7,75E+15 1,07E+06 0,00E+00 
TC99 1,23E+12 1,23E+12 1,23E+12 1,23E+12 1,23E+12 
TC99M 2,03E+16 6,68E+16 7,50E+15 1,03E+06 0,00E+00 
RU103 4,60E+16 4,53E+16 3,86E+16 7,88E+15 9,91E+08 
RH103M 4,59E+16 4,52E+16 3,86E+16 7,87E+15 9,89E+08 
RU105 1,15E+16 3,95E+14 8,96E-01 0,00E+00 0,00E+00 
RH105 1,60E+16 1,15E+16 1,68E+14 6,87E-05 0,00E+00 
RU106 5,41E+15 5,40E+15 5,31E+15 4,49E+15 8,38E+14 
RH106 5,41E+15 5,40E+15 5,31E+15 4,49E+15 8,38E+14 
AG110M 1,04E+13 1,04E+13 1,02E+13 7,92E+12 6,51E+11 
AG111 3,87E+14 3,56E+14 1,54E+14 3,55E+10 1,53E-26 
SB125 3,25E+14 3,25E+14 3,23E+14 3,03E+14 1,62E+14 
TE125M 7,48E+13 7,48E+13 7,47E+13 7,27E+13 3,96E+13 
SN126 4,23E+10 4,23E+10 4,23E+10 4,23E+10 4,23E+10 
SB126 3,30E+07 3,22E+08 2,54E+09 5,90E+09 5,92E+09 
SB126M 4,21E+10 4,23E+10 4,23E+10 4,23E+10 4,23E+10 
SB127 2,55E+15 2,17E+15 4,30E+14 3,94E+07 0,00E+00 
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TE127 2,56E+15 2,21E+15 6,06E+14 1,21E+14 3,97E+11 
TE127M 2,17E+14 2,18E+14 2,16E+14 1,24E+14 4,04E+11 
TE129 9,74E+14 9,57E+14 7,95E+14 1,24E+14 1,07E+06 
TE129M 1,52E+15 1,49E+15 1,24E+15 1,93E+14 1,67E+06 
I129 1,55E+09 1,55E+09 1,55E+09 1,56E+09 1,56E+09 
I131 4,54E+16 4,20E+16 1,93E+16 8,26E+12 1,66E-21 
TE132 6,65E+16 5,50E+16 8,10E+15 3,92E+07 0,00E+00 
I132 6,76E+16 5,66E+16 8,34E+15 4,04E+07 0,00E+00 
I133 9,02E+16 4,39E+16 3,28E+13 1,80E-18 0,00E+00 
XE133 1,05E+17 1,01E+17 3,33E+16 2,27E+11 0,00E+00 
CS134 7,16E+15 7,15E+15 7,09E+15 6,53E+15 2,85E+15 
I135 7,70E+16 7,88E+15 1,00E+06 0,00E+00 0,00E+00 
XE135 3,78E+16 2,55E+16 3,50E+09 0,00E+00 0,00E+00 
CS135 5,27E+10 5,27E+10 5,27E+10 5,27E+10 5,27E+10 
CS136 2,13E+15 2,03E+15 1,26E+15 1,10E+13 2,86E-08 
CS137 8,83E+15 8,83E+15 8,82E+15 8,77E+15 8,29E+15 
BA137M 8,34E+15 8,33E+15 8,33E+15 8,28E+15 7,83E+15 
BA140 9,72E+16 9,25E+16 5,67E+16 4,26E+14 2,42E-07 
LA140 1,00E+17 9,86E+16 6,51E+16 4,90E+14 2,79E-07 
CE141 8,79E+16 8,62E+16 7,11E+16 1,04E+16 4,81E+07 
CE143 8,91E+16 5,66E+16 6,06E+14 1,20E-05 0,00E+00 
PR143 9,33E+16 9,23E+16 6,22E+16 6,28E+14 6,79E-06 
PR144 6,55E+16 6,54E+16 6,40E+16 5,14E+16 5,75E+15 
PR144M 9,17E+14 9,15E+14 8,96E+14 7,19E+14 8,05E+13 
CE144 6,55E+16 6,54E+16 6,40E+16 5,14E+16 5,75E+15 
ND147 3,49E+16 3,30E+16 1,87E+16 6,37E+13 1,35E-11 
PM147 1,45E+16 1,45E+16 1,46E+16 1,39E+16 7,25E+15 
SM147 3,12E+05 3,12E+05 3,14E+05 3,38E+05 5,02E+05 
ND148 2,41E+04 2,41E+04 2,41E+04 2,41E+04 2,41E+04 
PM148 6,81E+15 6,07E+15 1,94E+15 1,52E+13 4,16E+06 
PM148M 1,53E+15 1,51E+15 1,30E+15 2,86E+14 7,86E+07 
PM149 2,29E+16 1,73E+16 1,03E+15 5,78E+02 0,00E+00 
SM151 1,74E+13 1,75E+13 1,76E+13 1,76E+13 1,73E+13 
PM151 6,41E+15 3,79E+15 1,94E+13 2,47E-10 0,00E+00 
SM153 1,45E+16 1,05E+16 4,13E+14 3,65E+00 0,00E+00 
EU154 2,49E+14 2,49E+14 2,48E+14 2,44E+14 2,00E+14 
EU155 1,35E+14 1,35E+14 1,35E+14 1,30E+14 9,01E+13 
EU156 5,71E+15 5,48E+15 3,64E+15 5,98E+13 8,73E-05 
TB160 3,90E+12 3,87E+12 3,55E+12 1,50E+12 2,68E+08 
TL208 2,09E+07 2,10E+07 2,16E+07 2,81E+07 9,36E+07 
PB210 1,05E-05 2,72E-03 2,72E-01 2,72E+01 2,73E+03 
BI210 1,05E-05 2,72E-03 2,72E-01 2,72E+01 2,73E+03 
PO210 1,05E-05 2,72E-03 2,72E-01 2,72E+01 2,73E+03 
BI214 1,05E-05 2,72E-03 2,72E-01 2,72E+01 2,73E+03 
PB214 1,05E-05 2,72E-03 2,72E-01 2,72E+01 2,73E+03 
PO214 1,05E-05 2,72E-03 2,72E-01 2,72E+01 2,73E+03 
PO218 1,05E-05 2,72E-03 2,72E-01 2,72E+01 2,73E+03 
RN222 1,05E-05 2,72E-03 2,72E-01 2,72E+01 2,73E+03 
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RA226 1,05E-05 2,72E-03 2,72E-01 2,72E+01 2,73E+03 
TH228 5,81E+07 5,82E+07 6,00E+07 7,80E+07 2,60E+08 
TH230 4,59E+02 4,59E+03 4,59E+04 4,59E+05 4,60E+06 
U232 2,56E+08 2,57E+08 2,59E+08 2,82E+08 4,48E+08 
PA233 1,71E+10 1,71E+10 1,71E+10 1,71E+10 1,71E+10 
U233 2,04E+01 2,04E+02 2,04E+03 2,04E+04 2,04E+05 
PA234 5,03E+04 2,12E+05 2,31E+05 2,31E+05 2,31E+05 
PA234M 1,78E+08 1,78E+08 1,78E+08 1,78E+08 1,78E+08 
TH234 1,81E+08 1,81E+08 1,80E+08 1,78E+08 1,78E+08 
U234 1,82E+11 1,82E+11 1,82E+11 1,82E+11 1,83E+11 
U235 4,29E+09 4,29E+09 4,29E+09 4,29E+09 4,29E+09 
U236 3,85E+10 3,85E+10 3,85E+10 3,85E+10 3,85E+10 
PU236 1,01E+10 1,01E+10 1,00E+10 9,47E+09 5,26E+09 
U237 3,15E+16 2,88E+16 1,14E+16 1,11E+12 6,74E+09 
NP237 1,68E+10 1,69E+10 1,70E+10 1,71E+10 1,71E+10 
PU238 8,09E+13 8,11E+13 8,15E+13 8,16E+13 8,04E+13 
NP238 1,01E+16 7,52E+15 3,95E+14 1,23E+08 1,22E+08 
U238 1,78E+08 1,78E+08 1,78E+08 1,78E+08 1,78E+08 
PU239 7,50E+11 7,52E+11 7,57E+11 7,58E+11 7,58E+11 
U239 4,12E+14 9,81E-03 0,00E+00 0,00E+00 0,00E+00 
NP239 2,72E+16 2,09E+16 1,48E+15 2,31E+10 2,31E+10 
NP240 5,12E+12 2,55E+06 0,00E+00 0,00E+00 0,00E+00 
PU240 1,05E+12 1,05E+12 1,05E+12 1,05E+12 1,05E+12 
PU241 3,20E+14 3,20E+14 3,19E+14 3,16E+14 2,80E+14 
AM241 6,00E+11 6,01E+11 6,14E+11 7,39E+11 1,91E+12 
PU242 4,16E+09 4,16E+09 4,16E+09 4,16E+09 4,16E+09 
CM242 1,16E+14 1,16E+14 1,12E+14 7,66E+13 1,69E+12 
AM242M 2,74E+10 2,74E+10 2,74E+10 2,74E+10 2,70E+10 
AM242 2,22E+14 8,71E+13 3,49E+10 2,73E+10 2,69E+10 
PU243 2,38E+14 1,16E+13 8,81E-01 0,00E+00 0,00E+00 
AM243 2,31E+10 2,31E+10 2,31E+10 2,31E+10 2,31E+10 
CM243 2,10E+10 2,10E+10 2,09E+10 2,08E+10 1,96E+10 
AM244 5,12E+13 1,16E+13 4,24E+06 0,00E+00 0,00E+00 
CM244 1,43E+12 1,43E+12 1,43E+12 1,41E+12 1,29E+12 
CM245 6,88E+07 6,88E+07 6,88E+07 6,88E+07 6,88E+07 
CM246 1,04E+07 1,04E+07 1,04E+07 1,04E+07 1,04E+07 
CM248 2,28E+01 2,28E+01 2,28E+01 2,28E+01 2,28E+01 
CF252 7,86E+02 7,85E+02 7,80E+02 7,31E+02 3,83E+02 
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Abstract This report discusses inventory and source term properties in regard 
to operation and possible releases due to accidents from Russian 
marine reactor systems. The first part of the report discusses relevant 
accidents on the basis of both Russian and western sources. The 
overview shows that certain vessels were much more accident prone 
compared to others, in addition, there have been a noteworthy 
reduction in accidents the last two decades. However, during the last 
years new types of incidents, such as collisions, has occurred more 
frequently. The second part of the study considers in detail the most 
important factors for the source term; reactor operational 
characteristics and the radionuclide inventory. While Russian 
icebreakers has been operated on a similar basis as commercial 
power plants, the submarines has different power cyclograms which 
results in considerable lower values for fission product inventory. 
Theoretical values for radionuclide inventory are compared with 
computed results using the modelling tool HELIOS. Regarding 
inventory of transuranic elements, the results of the calculations are 
discussed in detail for selected vessels. Criticality accidents, loss-of-
cooling accidents and sinking accidents are considered, bases on 
actual experiences with these types of accident and on theoretical 
considerations, and source terms for these accidents are discussed in 
the last chapter. 
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